Barata v. Abalos, Jr.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The petitioner, Evelio P. Barata, heads the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners' Association, Inc., whose members occupied a parcel of land in Mandaluyong City. The City Government initiated a housing project for these members, requiring them to vacate the area. The project was to be completed within 540 days from June 1995. When the construction period lapsed without completion, petitioner and the association members made demands for completion from the former City Mayor, Benjamin Abalos, Sr., and subsequently from the respondent Mayor, Benjamin Abalos, Jr., alleging these demands were ignored. Procedural History: On May 17, 1999, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against respondent Mayor Abalos, Jr. with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. 6713, specifically for failing to act promptly on public requests. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence on July 21, 1999, and denied the motion for reconsideration on September 10, 1999. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 140272), which was denied by the Second Division on November 24, 1999, citing A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC and the Fabian v. Desierto ruling. Subsequently, on February 1, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition on April 10, 2000, holding that decisions exonerating a mayor from administrative charges are not appealable and that the petition was filed out of time. The Petition: The present petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. The sole ground raised is that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion by ruling that the Ombudsman's decision exonerating respondent Abalos, Jr. is not appealable. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to Fabian v. Desierto, decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The respondents, however, contend that decisions absolving a respondent are final and unappealable under the Ombudsman's rules and that, even if appealable, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision exonerating respondent Abalos, Jr. of an administrative charge is not appealable. Whether decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are appealable to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. Whether the petition was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ratio Decidendi
On the appealability of the Ombudsman's decision: The Court reiterated the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, which declared the last paragraph of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 invalid and of no effect. This paragraph provided that orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases could be appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari. The Fabian ruling established that such appeals should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as an appeal directly to the Supreme Court would violate the constitutional proscription against increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it had appellate authority, but the issue then became whether the specific decision in this case was appealable. On the finality of decisions absolving a respondent: The Court referred to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), which explicitly states that "Where the respondent is absolved of the charge... the decision shall be final and unappealable." While this specific instance of finality was not explicitly enumerated in Section 27 of R.A. 6770, the Court found it implicit that decisions absolving a respondent should be final and unappealable. The Court clarified that the complainant is not deprived of recourse in cases of oppressive or arbitrary action by the Ombudsman, as they may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised in accordance with law. On the timeliness of the appeal and the Court of Appeals' failure to discuss R.A. 6713: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Ombudsman's decision was appealable, the Court found that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. The Order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on October 15, 1999. Under Section 27 of R.A. 6770, the appeal should have been filed within ten (10) days, or by October 25, 1999. Even with a possible extension under Rule 43, the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals only on February 1, 2000, which was "way beyond the reglementary period." The Court noted that the Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the case concerning Section 5(a) of R.A. 6713 because the petition was filed out of time. The filing of a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court did not toll the running of the period to file the petition with the Court of Appeals. The Court found no reason to disturb the findings of the lower court.
Main Doctrine
Decisions of the Ombudsman absolving a respondent of an administrative charge are final and unappealable. The proper remedy for a complainant, in cases of oppressive or arbitrary action by the Ombudsman, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not an appeal. Furthermore, appeals from Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases should be filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, not directly with the Supreme Court.