Belicena v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 143190 · 2001-10-17 · J. PARDO, J.: · Primary: Taxation; Secondary: Civil Service
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Antonio P. Belicena, an Undersecretary in the Department of Finance, was designated Acting Secretary of Finance for a period of one day, May 22, 1997, while the incumbent Secretary was on official travel. Upon reaching the compulsory retirement age, Belicena's terminal leave pay was computed. A dispute arose regarding the basis for this computation: whether it should be his salary as Undersecretary or the higher salary of the Acting Secretary of Finance for that single day. 2. Procedural History: The initial computation of Belicena's terminal leave pay excluded the salary he received as Acting Secretary of Finance. This led to a difference in the amount calculated. The matter was referred to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which initially ruled in favor of Belicena, stating his terminal leave should be based on his highest salary as Acting Secretary. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the Officer-in-Charge of the Department of Finance, the CSC reversed its decision. Belicena then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the CSC's revised ruling. This led to the present appeal to the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Belicena filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to nullify the Civil Service Commission's resolutions that denied him terminal leave pay based on his highest salary as Acting Secretary of Finance. He argued that his designation was valid under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and that his highest monthly salary should be the basis for the computation. The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.

Issue(s)

Whether the petitioner's terminal leave pay should be computed based on his salary as Acting Secretary of Finance. Whether the designation of the petitioner as Acting Secretary of Finance falls under Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Ruling

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the initial ruling of the Civil Service Commission, holding that the petitioner's terminal leave pay should be computed based on his highest monthly salary, which is that corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance, excluding COLA and RATA.

Ratio Decidendi

On whether the petitioner's terminal leave pay should be computed based on his salary as Acting Secretary of Finance: The Court held that the money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree's highest monthly salary. In this case, the petitioner received the salary corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance while he was designated as Acting Secretary from May 22 to 25, 1997. This designation was made by the President during the travel abroad of the incumbent Secretary. The Court cited the Commission on Audit's opinion that an official appointed or designated in an acting capacity pursuant to Section 17 of the Administrative Code is entitled to salary differential, and this should be included in the computation of his highest monthly salary for terminal leave purposes. Therefore, the highest monthly salary of the petitioner for the computation of his terminal leave credit is that of the Secretary of Finance. On whether the designation of the petitioner as Acting Secretary of Finance falls under Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987: The Court found that the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987. This section allows the President to temporarily designate an officer to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch when the regularly appointed officer is unable to perform duties by reason of illness, absence, or any other cause. The Court reasoned that the President's designation was made under the opinion that the absence of Secretary de Ocampo was of such an extent that he would be unable to perform his duties. While the CSC and the Court of Appeals interpreted "any other cause" narrowly, the Supreme Court's interpretation, supported by the Commission on Audit's stance, allowed for the inclusion of salary received during such valid designation in the computation of terminal leave pay. The Court clarified that the designation was temporary and did not exceed one year, as provided in the said section.

Main Doctrine

The money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree's highest monthly salary, which includes salary received while serving in an acting capacity, provided the designation is valid and in accordance with law.

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