Lagran v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each count and to pay a fine of P125,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Procedural History: Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief. The decision became final and executory on August 6, 1997. Petitioner was committed to the Quezon City Jail on February 24, 1999, and subsequently transferred to the New Bilibid Prison where he has been serving his sentence. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release on the ground that he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. He argued that under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, identical penalties emanating from one court and one complaint should be served simultaneously. He claimed to have been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days as of February 28, 2001, asserting his continued detention is without legal basis.
Issue(s)
Whether the penalties imposed for three counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 should be served simultaneously. Whether the petitioner has completed the service of his sentence.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Supreme Court ruled that penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously and must be served successively.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of simultaneous service of sentences: The Court reiterated that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties permits. Penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty, such as imprisonment, cannot be served simultaneously by reason of their nature. The Court cited jurisprudence, including Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons and Gordon vs. Wolfe, to support the principle that where an accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, these terms should be served successively. The penalties that can be served simultaneously are those not involving deprivation of liberty, such as disqualification, suspension, fine, and bond to keep the peace. The nature of the sentence imposed on the petitioner, which was imprisonment for each count, did not allow for simultaneous service. Therefore, the petitioner's argument that his sentences should have been served concurrently was without merit. On the issue of completion of sentence: Based on the ruling that the sentences must be served successively, the Court found that the petitioner had not yet completed the service of his sentence. He commenced serving his sentence on February 24, 1999. Given the successive nature of his sentences, his claim of having served the full duration of his sentence by February 28, 2001, was incorrect. Consequently, his detention in the New Bilibid Prison was still legally justified, and his prayer for immediate release through a writ of habeas corpus had no legal basis. The petition was therefore dismissed for lack of merit.
Main Doctrine
Penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously; where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively.