Villaber v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Pablo C. Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for Congressman in the First District of Davao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy on February 19, 2001, and Cagas on February 28, 2001. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and cancel his certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted on March 2, 1990, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) and sentenced to one year imprisonment for issuing a bouncing check for P100,000.00. Cagas argued that this crime involves moral turpitude, disqualifying Villaber under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and a petition for review on certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court, with the resolution becoming final and executory on October 26, 1992. Cagas also alleged that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating he was "Eligible for the office I seek to be elected," a ground for cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Procedural History: Villaber countered that his conviction was not final and executory as the decision was not promulgated in his presence, and that violation of BP 22 does not involve moral turpitude. After the parties submitted their position papers, the case was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC's Second Division disqualified Villaber and cancelled his certificate of candidacy, ruling that BP 22 involves moral turpitude based on the ruling in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc on May 10, 2001. The Petition: Villaber filed a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the COMELEC's resolutions.
Issue(s)
Whether the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner Villaber and cancelling his certificate of candidacy.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude: The Court held that a conviction for violation of BP 22 imports deceit and affects the good moral character of a person. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of BP 22 include the knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. This element of knowledge and the subsequent dishonor of the check demonstrate a disregard for honesty and good faith. The Court reiterated its ruling in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, stating that the effects of issuing a worthless check transcend private interests and touch upon the interests of the community at large, as the circulation of valueless commercial papers can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system, and ultimately hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Therefore, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on private duties owed to fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals. On the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which disqualifies individuals sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court affirmed that the conviction of Villaber for violation of BP 22, which had become final and executory, involved moral turpitude. The COMELEC's reliance on the established jurisprudence, particularly People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, was proper. The Court also clarified that the ruling in Tuanda regarding moral turpitude in BP 22 violations applies to both lawyers and non-lawyers, and that the modification of penalties in cases like Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines and Vaca vs. Court of Appeals did not alter the nature of the offense as involving moral turpitude, but rather addressed the philosophy behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law concerning the imposition of penalties.
Main Doctrine
A conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, disqualifying the offender from running for public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the offense imports deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.