People v. Jimmy Jacob y Lopez

G.R. Nos. 138576-77 · 2001-07-13 · J. CURIAM, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial

REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The facts involve the elements of Rape under Philippine Law. The accused was charged with two counts of incestuous rape allegedly committed on 1 November 1995 and 2 November 1995 against his daughter, then a minor. The victim reported the incidents to relatives and the police; a medico-legal examination showed lacerations consistent with the crime charged. The accused denied the allegations and asserted an alibi and an alternative suspect. The victim later became pregnant in 1997 while living with another relative. A week before 1 November 1995, Celina Jacob was fetched by her father, accused Jimmy Jacob, from her grandmother's house in Silang, Cavite, to stay with him in his "barracks" in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas, to cook for him. At around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 1 November 1995, she and her father were lying down and preparing to sleep on an improvised bed of wooden planks. Suddenly the accused went on top of her and lasciviously kissed her on the lips. She resisted and bit him on the lips. He forcibly removed her pajama and panty and rammed his penis into her exposed genitalia. She could not effectively repulse his vicious sexual incursion since he threatened to hit her with a hammer. After unleashing his lust in his sexual misadventure with Celina, she sat on the bed to ease the pain in her genitalia. She could not leave the "barracks," which was now "hell" to her, as she did not know how to go back to her grandmother in Silang. Emboldened quite apparently by the helplessness of his daughter, his libido struck again the following evening. At around 7:00 o’clock, 2 November 1995, while Celina was lying in bed beside him, he mounted her once again and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. His overwhelming strength, coupled with his threats to smash her head with his hammer, virtually rendered inutile any form of resistance from her. It was only providential that an aunt of hers visited her the following morning. The visit gave her the opportunity for escape by going with her aunt home to Lalaan, Silang, Cavite, where she recounted her nightmarish ordeal to Rolando Amon, her uncle and her aunt's husband, who then brought her to the police station to file her complaint. Explaining the medico-legal certificate he issued to Celina, Dr. Jaime L. Butiong pointed out that she suffered lacerations of the hymen at 4:00, 6:00 and 8:00 o’clock positions most probably as a result of the entry of the male organ into her genitalia. But other than those lacerations, Dr. Butiong found no other physical injuries. Jimmy Jacob denied the accusations against him. He said that on 1 November 1995 he was idly spending his time with his co-workers at the construction site in Batulao, Nasugbu, Batangas, as work was suspended because of a raging typhoon. At around 7:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, 2 November, his daughter was with him at the construction site. He instructed her to proceed to their living quarters to prepare lunch. When he followed his daughter a little later, he was taken aback when he saw his brother-in-law on top of Celina and apparently having sexual intercourse with her. Equally stunned by the sudden appearance of the accused, Rolando and Celina immediately stood up and fled. He gave chase but the two (2) were able to run away. The accused then boarded a vehicle bound for Lalaan where he thought the two (2) might have gone. As soon as Jimmy arrived at Rolando's house around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Rolando together with some bystanders accosted Jimmy and accused him of raping Celina. They brought Jimmy to the municipal jail where he was detained. The police did not believe his protestations of innocence and his insistence that it was in fact his brother-in-law who raped his daughter. Jimmy and Celina saw each other at the police station but apparently angry at her father, she avoided him like a plague. The accused could only theorize that his daughter was probably brainwashed by Rolando into hating him, and that Rolando even threatened to harm her if she talked to him. Jimmy also said that he was rebuffed by Rolando when he attempted to confront the latter about having abused his daughter. Upon taking the witness stand again, a privilege which was granted him at this instance, the accused informed the court that his daughter became pregnant in 1997 although she was not married, but did not know who was responsible for her pregnancy although one thing was certain - she was then living with his brother-in-law in Lalaan, Silang, Cavite. Controverting the version of the accused, Rolando Amon denied that he had sexual intercourse with Celina inside the "barracks" of Jimmy in the morning of 2 November 1995. He asserted that on 1 November he was in fact in Alfonso, Cavite, selling ice cream, and on 2 November he was in Balayan, Batangas, also selling ice cream and stayed there until 3:00 o’clock in the morning of 3 November. The following day he learned from his niece Celina that she had been molested by her father thus prompting him to cause the arrest and detention of his brother-in-law Jimmy Jacob. The trial court did not sustain the defense of alibi and denial. According to the court, the affirmative testimony of the complaining witness was much stronger than the denial of the accused. It found the defense too weak and far from convincing as against the positive testimony of Celina that her father, the accused, Jimmy Jacob y Lopez, raped her on 1 and 2 November 1995 in his "barracks" in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas, as it found Celina's testimony straightforward, candid and "free from tergiversation." Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of two counts of incestuous rape, sentenced him to death for each count, and awarded moral damages. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court. The Appeal: The accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily pass the test of moral certainty and/or standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for his conviction. He claims that the testimony of the complaining witness is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies as to effectively cast serious doubt on her credibility. He also notes that Celina had the tendency not to respond to questions propounded to her at the trial which underscores the improbability of the rape in the "barracks" with so many co-workers of accused-appellant present. The Supreme Court found the arguments without merit, stating that the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions are so minor and inconsequential to warrant a reversal of accused-appellant's conviction, and the triviality of the supposed inconsistencies can hardly affect the substance or veracity and weight of the complaining witness' testimony which, on the contrary, only serves to reinforce rather than weaken her credibility. The accused-appellant also belabored to impress the Court that it was highly improbable for him to have perpetrated the crime of rape as the "barracks" was occupied by many individuals. However, the complaining witness categorically asserted that only the two of them, referring to herself and her father, were occupying her father's "barracks" on the two occasions that she was abused by him. The Supreme Court reiterated that rape can be committed even in the most unlikely places, such as parks, schools and other areas frequented by people. The accused-appellant insisted that it was his brother-in-law who ravished his daughter, and not he. However, the Court was not convinced, stating that it is not easy to persuade a young girl to have herself physically examined and thereafter undergo the rigors of a public trial for rape brought against the very man who sired her if she was not motivated by a genuine desire to bring the perpetrator to the bar of justice. Moreover, the accused-appellant himself admitted that Celina was mad at him and even went to the extent of avoiding him altogether, an attitude she never exhibited before 1 November 1995. The accused-appellant questioned the imposition on him of the death sentence, two death sentences in fact, in view of what he described as the failure of the prosecution to establish that his daughter was below eighteen (18) at the time of the rape. While it is true that the Information alleged that Celina was fourteen (14) years old, having been born on 23 September 1980, hence was fifteen (15) years, one (1) month and nine (9) days on 1 November 1995, this does not sufficiently prove that she was under eighteen (18) years of age to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The Court noted that in People v. Tipay, the presentation of a certificate of live birth or other equally acceptable official document concerning date of birth is vital and essential to ascertain the age of the victim. Such independent proof can only be dispensed with in cases where the court can take judicial notice of the victim's tender age in view of the manifest minority of the victim who may be below ten (10) years old. The crucial years, according to Tipay, pertain to the ages of fifteen (15) to seventeen (17) where minority may seem doubtful due to one's physical appearance. In that situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certitude that the victim was under eighteen (18) years of age when the rape case was committed to justify the imposition of the death penalty. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the victim is a minor, who was born on 23 September 1980, or fifteen years, one month and nine days on 1 November 1995, which accused-appellant, her own father, never denied; aside from the fact that it is amply supported by a baptismal certificate showing that indeed Celina was born on 23 September 1980 in Silang, Cavite, and was christened three (3) months later on 25 December 1980. Relative to the acceptability of a baptismal certificate as an independent proof to establish the minority of the victim, the Court referred to People v. Contreras, where minority as a qualifying circumstance was disallowed for failure of the prosecution to present a birth certificate or at least a baptismal certificate to support the bare testimony of the victim as to her exact age. People v. Liban was more categorical, stating that "the Court has consistently adhered to the idea that the victim's minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information but must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt during trial x x x x The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented." Article 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The two (2) Informations charging accused-appellant with rape clearly alleged that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter, Celina Jacob, then fourteen (14) years of age. Celina testified that she was born on 23 September 1980 which was corroborated by her baptismal certificate, thus undeniably showing that she was fifteen (15) years old when she was raped on 1 and 2 November 1995. The concurrence of minority of the private complainant and her relationship to the offender having been alleged in the two (2) Informations and duly established by the prosecution during the trial constrained the Court to affirm the conviction of accused-appellant of qualified rape on two (2) counts and the imposition of the death penalty in each case. Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray, that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed. As to the civil indemnity, accused-appellant was made to pay the amount of P150,000.00 or P75,000.00 for each of the two (2) counts of rape in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The award of P100,000.00 for moral damages for both cases, or P50,000.00 for each count of rape, was affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant JIMMY JACOB Y LOPEZ guilty of two (2) counts of incestuous rape and imposing on him the DEATH penalty in each case and ordering him to pay his victim, his own daughter Celina A. Jacob, the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages for both cases, with the modification that he was further ordered to pay her the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity in each case, or P150,000.00 for both cases. Upon finality of this Decision, the records of the case were forwarded to Her Excellency the President for the possible exercise of her pardoning power.

Issue(s)

Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Whether alleged inconsistencies in the complaining witness' testimony defeat her credibility. Whether the defense of alibi and the accusation against a third party were properly sustained. Whether the victim's minority was sufficiently proven to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Whether a baptismal certificate may serve as competent proof of the victim's age in the absence of a birth certificate. Whether the imposition and quantum of civil indemnity and moral damages should be modified. Whether the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659 is constitutionally infirm for purposes of this case.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for two counts of incestuous rape and the imposition of the death penalty for each count. The Court affirmed moral damages in the aggregate amount of P100,000.00 and modified the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00 for each count (P150,000.00 total). The records are to be forwarded to the President for possible exercise of clemency.

Ratio Decidendi

On Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt: The Court found that the affirmative testimony of the complaining witness was straightforward, candid and free from tergiversation and that such testimony, being positive and direct, carried sufficient weight to support conviction. The Court held that minor inconsistencies pointed out by the defense were trivial and inconsequential and did not affect the veracity of the core testimony establishing the elements of the crime charged. The medico-legal report corroborated material aspects of the victim's testimony by showing injuries consistent with the crime charged, thereby lending further credence to the prosecutrix. The Court emphasized that the accused's denials and alternative explanations were not sufficiently convincing to overcome the positive testimony of the victim. Applying the principle that credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine, the Supreme Court deferred to the trial court's appreciation of evidence where the testimony was coherent and corroborated. On Whether alleged inconsistencies in the complaining witness' testimony defeat her credibility: The Court remarked that the supposed contradictions were minor and inconsequential and that such trivial inconsistencies cannot warrant reversal of the conviction. It explained that minor lapses in recollection or momentary failure to answer questions do not necessarily invalidate otherwise consistent and credible testimony. The decision noted that such human frailties in testimony may, in fact, reinforce rather than weaken the credibility of a witness. The Court further observed that the complaining witness had no apparent motive to fabricate the accusation against the accused and that her conduct after the incidents (avoiding the accused, reporting to relatives) was consistent with truthful reporting. Consequently, the Court held that the inconsistencies did not negate the prosecution's proof beyond reasonable doubt. On Whether the defense of alibi and the accusation against a third party were properly sustained: The Court found the alibi and the accusation against the brother-in-law unpersuasive, stating that the accused's version failed to convincingly establish that another person committed the crime. The Court noted that the alternative suspect denied the allegation and provided alibi testimony of his own movements which the Court found credible in rebutting the accused's claim. The Court underscored that it is not easy to persuade a young complainant to undergo medical examination and a public trial against a close relative unless motivated by a genuine desire to seek justice. Given the totality of the evidence, the Court concluded that the defense's explanations were weak compared to the positive, corroborated testimony of the victim and the medical findings. On Whether the victim's minority was sufficiently proven to justify the imposition of the death penalty: The Court reiterated the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving with certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age when the rape was committed to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The Court found that the victim's date of birth was testified to at trial as 23 September 1980 and that this was corroborated by a baptismal certificate showing the date of birth and christening. Given those proofs, the Court concluded that the victim was fifteen (15) years old at the time of the incidents, satisfying the qualifying circumstance under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The Court therefore held that the imposition of the death penalty was legally justified in this case. On Whether a baptismal certificate may serve as competent proof of the victim's age in the absence of a birth certificate: The Court applied prior decisions to hold that when a birth certificate is not presented, a baptismal certificate or other similar documentary evidence may be acceptable to prove age, particularly where corroborated by testimony. The Court cited precedents indicating that for ages where physical appearance may not be determinative (fifteen to seventeen), documentary evidence is required to establish minority beyond reasonable doubt; a baptismal certificate can serve as such documentary evidence. The Court thus accepted the baptismal certificate presented as sufficient to establish the victim's minority in this case. On Whether the imposition and quantum of civil indemnity and moral damages should be modified: The Court affirmed the award of moral damages in the aggregate amount of P100,000.00 but modified the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 per count, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The Court thereby ordered the accused to pay civil indemnity totaling P150,000.00 and moral damages totaling P100,000.00. The Court explained that the modification was consistent with established awards for similar crimes and circumstances. On Whether the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659 is constitutionally infirm for purposes of this case: Although four members of the Court maintained their adherence to prior separate opinions holding the death penalty unconstitutional under Republic Act No. 7659, the majority found the law constitutional and accordingly imposed the death penalty. The Court noted the concurring members' reservations but proceeded to apply the law as constitutional in affirming the sentence.

Main Doctrine

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's minority to justify the imposition of the death penalty; in the absence of a birth certificate, a baptismal certificate or other documentary evidence may suffice to establish minority when corroborated by testimony.