People v. Cabacan

G.R. No. 130965 · 2002-08-22 · J. QUISUMBING, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: On January 14, 1995, at around 5:00 PM, Nestor Vibas was invited to a drinking session. Later, Restituto Cabacan and Edmundo Corpuz were also invited. During the session, an altercation ensued between Cabacan and Vibas, resulting in Vibas punching Cabacan. Romeo Lundang pacified them and brought Vibas to his house, about 400 meters away, while Cabacan was left behind. Despite his wife's advice to stay inside, Vibas sat outside his house along the road with his back to the street. About thirty minutes later, at around 8:00 PM, Vibas' wife heard him shout and saw Cabacan making a thrust at Vibas' back, causing Vibas to fall. Cabacan then rode his bicycle and fled. Vibas' wife noticed blood oozing from his side and he was rushed to the hospital, but died en route. The wife identified Cabacan as the assailant due to the presence of light and her familiarity with him, noting his defective foot. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, found appellant Restituto Cabacan guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties, and to pay civil indemnity and actual damages. The Petition: The accused appealed the RTC decision, assigning errors regarding the finding of treachery and his conviction for murder.

Issue(s)

Whether treachery attended the killing of the victim. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and if so, of what crime.

Ruling

The Supreme Court modified the RTC decision. It found that treachery was not proven, thus reducing the conviction from murder to homicide. The accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, and ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages to the heirs of the deceased.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of treachery: The Court held that treachery could not be appreciated in this case. While the victim was stabbed from behind, the attack was not a preconceived mode of attack adopted to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to the assailant. Approximately an hour before the stabbing, the victim and the appellant had an altercation where the victim punched the appellant. This prior incident placed the victim on guard against possible retaliation. The stabbing occurred when the appellant chanced upon the victim sitting alone by the roadside. The Court reasoned that the attack might have been a result of rash and impetuous impulse rather than a deliberate act of will, especially since the victim was already aware of the appellant's hostile attitude. The rule on sudden attack constituting treachery does not apply when the attack is not preconceived but is triggered by sudden anger. On the conviction for murder: Since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the crime committed was not murder but homicide. The Court agreed with the trial court that the appellant was responsible for the killing of the victim, based on the credible testimony of the victim's wife who positively identified the appellant. The appellant's defense, which claimed he was attacked again by the victim and fled when people approached, was found to be not credible. The Court noted that flight is indicative of guilt. However, the absence of treachery meant the crime was homicide, not murder.

Main Doctrine

Treachery cannot be appreciated when the attack, though from behind, was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by a sudden anger arising from a prior altercation, especially when the victim was already aware of the assailant's hostile attitude.

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