People v. Quening
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Armando Quening y Versoza was charged with murder for allegedly hacking Antonio dela Cruz y Rebesi to death on March 12, 1995, in Masbate. The prosecution presented Bernadeth dela Cruz, the victim's widow, who testified that she saw her husband talking to the appellant's wife, overheard a suggestive remark, and then witnessed the appellant arrive, box her husband, and subsequently hack him to death with a bolo after an altercation. Another prosecution witness, Julito Rabino, corroborated the hacking incident, stating he saw the appellant hacking Antonio near the victim's gate and that the victim sustained wounds on his head and shoulder. Dr. Artemio G. Capellan presented the medico-legal findings, detailing seven fatal hacking wounds, with two located at the victim's back. The defense, through Orlando Bartola y Cabiles and the appellant himself, claimed self-defense, alleging the victim was the aggressor, armed with a bolo, and initiated the attack. The appellant claimed he disarmed the victim and then stabbed him in self-defense. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Petition: The appellant appealed the decision, primarily questioning the trial court's appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance and the overall finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He also challenged the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, thereby warranting a conviction for murder instead of homicide. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and whether the appellant's plea of self-defense is tenable. Whether the credibility of the witnesses warrants a modification of the trial court's decision. Whether the award of moral damages is proper.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified it from murder to homicide. The Court deleted the award of moral damages but ordered the payment of indemnity ex delicto. The appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of treachery: The Court held that treachery cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. While the victim sustained fatal wounds at his back, this fact alone does not automatically establish treachery. The testimony of the victim's wife, suggesting the appellant tapped the victim's shoulder before the attack, was not sufficiently conclusive to prove that the appellant deliberately adopted means to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Witness Rabino's testimony did not commence from the beginning of the incident, thus it could not support the allegation of treachery. Therefore, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery could not be appreciated. Given the absence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the Court modified the conviction from murder to homicide. The Court noted that the appellant's actions, particularly the number and severity of the wounds, indicated a determined effort to kill, thus establishing the intent to kill necessary for homicide. On the issue of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and self-defense: The Court found the appellant's claim of self-defense to be untenable. For self-defense to prosper, unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation must be present. The Court found no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The appellant's claim that he disarmed the victim, a bigger man armed with a bolo, while the appellant was unarmed and of smaller build, was deemed less than credible. Furthermore, the appellant did not sustain any wounds or bruises during the alleged struggle. The absence of the appellant's brother-in-law, Egoy, as a witness to corroborate the self-defense claim, also weakened the defense. The presence of seven fatal hack wounds on the victim, indicating a determined effort to kill, further negated the claim of self-defense. On the credibility of witnesses: The Court reiterated the principle that it gives great respect to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, as the trial court had the opportunity to observe their demeanor. The Court found the testimony of prosecution witness Julito Rabino to be consistent, straightforward, and candid, despite rigorous cross-examination, and found no ill motive imputed against him. Conversely, the testimony of the defense witness, Orlando Bartola y Cabiles, was deemed suspect due to his admitted political alliance with the appellant and his presence at the scene being coincidental. The Court found no reason to depart from the trial court's appreciation of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. On the award of damages: The Court deleted the award of P50,000 as moral damages, finding no basis for it in the records, as it was neither prayed for nor substantiated. However, the Court affirmed the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto for the heirs of the victim, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
Main Doctrine
The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated if it is not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the presence of fatal wounds at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, indicate treachery. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in favor of the accused.