Del Castillo v. Torrecampo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Jovendo Del Castillo was charged with violating Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code for disorderly conduct during the counting of votes on May 17, 1982. The Information alleged that he unlawfully struck electric and kerosene lamps, plunging the voting center into darkness and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. 2. Procedural History: Del Castillo was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur on January 14, 1985, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of one to three years imprisonment. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. The decision became final, and an execution of judgment was scheduled for October 14, 1987. Del Castillo failed to appear for the execution, leading to an arrest order and bond confiscation, though he was never apprehended. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, he filed a motion to quash the arrest warrant, arguing the penalty had prescribed, which the trial court denied. This denial was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 3. The Petition: The instant petition for review by way of certiorari seeks to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision. Petitioner Jovendo Del Castillo argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the penalty imposed upon him has not prescribed. He contends that the Court of Appeals engaged in judicial legislation by adding the phrase "by escaping during the term of the sentence" to Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, which he believes should commence running from the date he evaded service of his sentence, not from the date of escape during service.
Issue(s)
Whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed: The Court held that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has not prescribed. The prescription of penalties is governed by Articles 92 and 93 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Article 92 provides the periods for prescription of penalties, with correctional penalties prescribing in ten years. Article 93 states that the period of prescription commences to run from the date the culprit evades the service of his sentence. However, evasion of service of sentence, as defined by Article 157 of the RPC and jurisprudence, requires that the convict must have been committed to prison and thereafter escaped during the term of his sentence. In this case, petitioner Jovendo del Castillo was never brought to prison, nor did he serve any part of his sentence. He remained at large even before the scheduled execution of the judgment. Therefore, he cannot be considered to have "escaped" or "evaded service of sentence" in the legal sense contemplated by the RPC. Since he was never committed to prison, the period for the prescription of his penalty never commenced to run. On whether the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code: The Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA's ruling that evasion of sentence requires escaping "during the term of the sentence" is consistent with established jurisprudence, particularly the case of Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al.. The RPC is a special law, and its provisions on prescription of penalties are suppletory to special laws that do not provide for such prescription, as in the 1978 Election Code. The CA correctly applied the RPC provisions. The petitioner's contention that the CA engaged in judicial legislation is unfounded, as the CA merely applied the existing legal framework and jurisprudence to the facts of the case. The petitioner's failure to appear for the execution of his sentence and subsequent remaining at large meant he became a fugitive, and the Court will not reward such conduct by declaring the penalty prescribed when the conditions for prescription were never met.
Main Doctrine
The prescription of a penalty imposed by final sentence commences to run from the date the convict evades the service of his sentence. Evasion of service of sentence, as contemplated by Articles 93 and 157 of the Revised Penal Code, requires that the convict must have been committed to prison and thereafter escaped during the term of his sentence. One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom, and thus, prescription of penalty does not commence to run.