Teodoro v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: PAMI Development Corporation registered mining claims in Bulacan in 1959 and was issued Placer Lease Contracts (MLC) Nos. V-202 and V-203. These claims were subsequently sold to respondent Continental Cement Corporation. Later, Francisco and Tomas Teodoro applied for quarry permits over their property, which the Bureau of Mines denied due to conflict with respondent's mining claims. The Teodoros then petitioned for the cancellation of respondent's MLCs due to non-development, which was initially granted but later set aside by the Office of the President, reinstating respondent's contracts after finding that work obligations had been met. Procedural History: Respondent applied for renewal of its mining lease contracts, which, per DENR Administrative Order No. 82, required conversion to a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA). Respondent filed an MPSA application, which petitioner Tomas Teodoro opposed, claiming the area included his property. Petitioner's opposition was dismissed by the DENR Regional Executive Director and subsequently by the Secretary of DENR. The Office of the President initially dismissed petitioner's appeal but later reversed its decision, ordering the exclusion of Teodoro's land. Respondent's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied. Respondent then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which issued a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals eventually reversed the Office of the President's resolutions and made the TRO permanent. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which was denied due to lack of certification of non-forum-shopping and late filing. Petitioner's subsequent motions for reconsideration and leave to file another motion for reconsideration were also denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory. The Petition: Petitioner filed an original petition with the Supreme Court, seeking to declare the Court of Appeals' decision void. He argued that the Office of the President's resolutions were final when the petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals, thus divesting it of jurisdiction. Petitioner also alleged extrinsic fraud, claiming respondent misrepresented the filing of a second motion for reconsideration to appear timely. Furthermore, he contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow proper procedure under Rule 43 and that the lawyer who filed the second motion for reconsideration for respondent had a questionable background. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Office of the President's resolutions were not yet final and executory, that the second motion for reconsideration was not pro forma nor filed late, and that there was no extrinsic fraud that prevented petitioner from presenting his case. The Court ultimately dismissed the petition, emphasizing that litigation must end and that final and executory judgments cannot be attacked.
Issue(s)
Whether the resolutions of the Office of the President were final and executory when respondent Continental Cement Corporation filed its petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Whether the filing of the second Motion for Reconsideration by Continental Cement Corporation interrupted the period within which to appeal. Whether Continental Cement Corporation committed extrinsic fraud in filing its petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review filed by Continental Cement Corporation.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals' Decision is upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the resolutions of the Office of the President were final and executory: The Court found no truth to petitioner's allegation that the resolutions of the Office of the President had become final and executory. The resolution denying CCC's first Motion for Reconsideration was received on May 9, 1997, giving CCC until May 24, 1997, to file an appeal. CCC filed its Second Motion for Reconsideration on May 20, 1997, which was within the reglementary period. The OP denied this second motion on September 3, 1997, and CCC received the denial on September 12, 1997. CCC then filed its petition for review with the Court of Appeals on September 26, 1997, which was within the fifteen-day period allowed for appeals. On whether the filing of the second Motion for Reconsideration interrupted the period to appeal: The Court ruled that the filing of the second Motion for Reconsideration did interrupt the period to appeal. Petitioner argued it was filed by unauthorized counsel and was pro forma. However, the Court reiterated that in administrative proceedings, technical rules are not strictly applied, and the requirement of entry of appearance should not defeat a litigant's substantive right to appeal. The Court also found that the second motion was not pro forma simply because it reiterated issues already passed upon, as long as it complied with the Rules. Furthermore, the Court had already established that the second motion was not filed late. On whether extrinsic fraud was committed: The Court ruled in the negative. Extrinsic fraud, which prevents a party from presenting its case, was not present. The alleged misrepresentation regarding the mailing of the second motion for reconsideration did not prevent Teodoro from exhibiting his case. Moreover, applying Rule 47, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the ground of extrinsic fraud could have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief, and thus was effectively barred. Petitioner had already raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in his petition for review before the Supreme Court, which was denied. On whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction: The Court found that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction because the resolutions of the Office of the President were not yet final and executory when CCC filed its petition for review. The filing of the second motion for reconsideration, which was not pro forma and was timely filed, interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. Therefore, the petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals was timely and properly lodged, conferring jurisdiction upon it.
Main Doctrine
The perfection of an appeal within the period fixed by law is mandatory and failure to do so renders the decision final and executory, barring any subsequent appellate review. Allegations of extrinsic fraud cannot be used to annul a final and executory judgment if such fraud could have been raised in available remedial measures like a motion for reconsideration or petition for relief.