Lopez v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for issuing a subpoena without authority and for complicity in anomalous contracts. The Ombudsman dismissed the charge related to anomalous contracts but found Liggayu guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest Of The Service for issuing a subpoena in excess of his authority, imposing a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay, later modified to six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Procedural History: Liggayu filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the Ombudsman's decision. Petitioners implemented Liggayu's suspension on March 8, 2000. The Court of Appeals issued a TRO on March 16, 2000, enjoining the implementation of the suspension. Subsequently, on May 18, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Liggayu's prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, enjoining the immediate implementation of the suspension pending appeal. The Court of Appeals also ordered petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for failing to comply with the TRO. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, and the Court of Appeals ordered Liggayu's reinstatement pending resolution of his appeal. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolution granting the preliminary mandatory injunction and its subsequent order for reinstatement, contending that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay are immediately executory pending appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the execution of the Ombudsman's suspension order pending appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent pending appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 18, 2000, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the executory nature of Ombudsman decisions: The Court reiterated that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all provisional orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. However, it clarified that only decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary are final and unappealable, hence immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is more severe, such as the six (6) months and one (1) day suspension in this case, the law grants the respondent the right to appeal. The Court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, stating that the express mention of certain penalties as final and unappealable excludes other penalties from this classification. Therefore, an appeal timely filed stays the immediate implementation of decisions imposing penalties beyond those specified as final and unappealable. The Court cited Lapid v. Court of Appeals to support this interpretation, emphasizing that the essential nature of appealable judgments would be rendered nugatory if they were not stayed pending appeal. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunction: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Given that the penalty imposed on private respondent was six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay, and he had appealed the decision of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the suspension order was a matter of right. The Court reiterated that the appeal timely filed by the private respondent should stay the immediate implementation of the decision, as per the interpretation of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court also addressed the petitioners' argument regarding Rule 43, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that an appeal does not stay an award unless the Court directs otherwise. It clarified that while Fabian v. Desierto declared Section 27 of R.A. 6770 unconstitutional regarding the appeal forum (now the Court of Appeals instead of the Supreme Court), the provisions concerning the finality and execution of decisions remain valid and are not affected by the ruling. The separability clause in R.A. 6770 supports this interpretation. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion in ordering reinstatement: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' order for reinstatement pending appeal. This order was a logical consequence of the injunction enjoining the execution of the suspension. If the suspension was stayed, the employee should remain in his position. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion in ordering explanation for contempt: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the Court of Appeals' order for petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. This order was issued because petitioners failed to implement the TRO dated March 16, 2000. The Court of Appeals has the inherent power to ensure compliance with its lawful orders, and requiring an explanation for non-compliance is a standard procedure in such situations. The petitioners' explanation that they were not yet parties to the case when the TRO was issued was deemed insufficient to absolve them from potential contempt, especially considering the subsequent order for reinstatement.
Main Doctrine
Decisions of the Ombudsman imposing penalties other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, are not immediately executory and are stayed by a timely appeal. The execution of such decisions becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal.