Calvo v. United Coconut Planters Bank General Insurance Co., Inc.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, doing business as Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a customs broker, contracted with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to transfer 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area, Manila, to SMC's warehouse. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. The shipment arrived on July 14, 1990, and was unloaded to the custody of the arrastre operator. Between July 23 and July 25, 1990, petitioner withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC's warehouse. Upon inspection on July 25, 1990, 15 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 3 reels of kraft liner board were found to be damaged, with the damage assessed at P93,112.00. Procedural History: SMC collected from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent, as subrogee of SMC, filed suit against petitioner. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 148, Makati City, ruled in favor of respondent, finding petitioner liable for the damage. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the CA's decision, arguing that she was erroneously classified as a common carrier and that the CA decided the case on speculation rather than evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioner, a customs broker, is a common carrier. Whether petitioner exercised extraordinary diligence in the handling and transport of the cargo. Whether petitioner is liable for the damage to the cargo.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding petitioner liable for the damaged cargo.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether petitioner is a common carrier: The Court held that petitioner is a common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods for compensation, offering their services to the public. This definition does not distinguish between a principal business of carrying goods and an ancillary activity, nor between regular or scheduled services and occasional or episodic services. The Court cited De Guzman v. Court of Appeals to emphasize that the definition is broad and includes those offering services to a limited clientele for general business purposes. Since the transportation of goods was an integral part of petitioner's business as a customs broker and warehouseman, she falls under the definition of a common carrier, thereby entitling the cargo owners to the protection afforded by law to shippers dealing with common carriers. On whether petitioner exercised extraordinary diligence: The Court found that petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence. Article 1733 of the Civil Code mandates common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods. The Marine Survey Report indicated that the shipment was discharged from the vessel and received by the arrastre operator under clean Equipment Interchange Reports (EIRs), with only minor dents and paint scratches on the containers. Petitioner withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator without exception or protest regarding the condition of the containers or their contents. The cargo was subsequently delivered to the consignee damaged. The Court concluded that the damage must have occurred while the cargo was in petitioner's possession, as she failed to present any proof of the precautions taken or to rebut the presumption of negligence. The Court reiterated that to prove extraordinary diligence, more than just showing the possibility of another party being responsible is required; it necessitates proving that all reasonable means were used to ascertain the nature of the goods and that due care was exercised in handling them. On whether petitioner is liable for the damage to the cargo: The Court held petitioner liable for the damage. Under Article 1735 of the Civil Code, common carriers are presumed to be at fault or negligent if goods are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, unless they prove they observed extraordinary diligence. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. Furthermore, even if there were defects in the container vans, petitioner accepted the cargo without protest or exception, which would have exempted her from liability under Article 1734(4) had the defects been unknown or not apparent. Since petitioner did not prove extraordinary diligence nor any exempting cause, the presumption of negligence under Article 1735 stands, making her liable for the P93,112.00 in damages, plus legal interest and attorney's fees.
Main Doctrine
A customs broker who undertakes the transportation of goods is considered a common carrier, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods. Failure to prove the exercise of such diligence, or the existence of any exempting cause, renders the carrier liable for damages.