Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was an oppositor in a special proceeding case concerning the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz. Santiago was removed as administrator due to neglect, and his brother, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., was appointed as the new administrator, subject to the approval of an administrator's bond. Santiago and his brother Jose Maria opposed Nicolas' appointment and prayed for Jose Maria's appointment instead, submitting a certification and an agreement regarding a lease of nipa lands in favor of Santiago. Judge Roger B. Patricio denied the opposition but recognized the validity of the certification and agreement, stating the new administrator's role was subject to them. The order also held in abeyance the approval of Nicolas' bond pending a certification from the Supreme Court regarding the surety. Subsequently, Judge Sergio Pestaño approved Nicolas' bond. Petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI, then prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) for Nicolas, granting him full authority to take possession of all properties of the deceased. Nicolas, accompanied by security guards and a sheriff, took possession of the entire estate, including the nipa lands leased to Santiago. Procedural History: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz filed a letter-complaint with the Ombudsman (Visayas), alleging that petitioner committed falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Santiago claimed petitioner falsely attributed to Judge Pestaño the appointment of Nicolas with full authority, disregarding the lease agreement. Petitioner, in her counter-affidavit, stated she acted in compliance with Judge Pestaño's order and followed the prescribed form in the Manual for Clerks of Court, performing a ministerial duty without bad faith or partiality. The Graft Investigation Officer found probable cause against petitioner, concluding she acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to Santiago and giving unwarranted benefit to Nicolas. The Ombudsman issued a resolution finding a prima facie case and ordered the filing of informations. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce filed a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution and order of the Ombudsman, arguing that her duties as Clerk of Court were ministerial and that she acted in compliance with court orders and the prescribed legal forms, without any criminal intent.
Issue(s)
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e) and Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, as Clerk of Court, committed falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code by stating in the Letter of Administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. was appointed administrator by Judge Sergio Pestaño, when Judge Pestaño merely approved the administrator's bond. Whether petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury to Santiago B. Villaruz or giving unwarranted benefits to Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in issuing the Letter of Administration.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The resolution dated April 20, 2001, and the order dated June 29, 2001, of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) are SET ASIDE, and the complaint against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce is DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari: The Court held that it has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, especially when it is alleged that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is consistent with established jurisprudence, allowing direct recourse to the Supreme Court in such instances, even if Rule 65, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure might suggest filing with the Court of Appeals for quasi-judicial agencies. The Court reiterated that the paramount consideration is to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights and ensure the orderly administration of justice, preventing unwarranted prosecutions. On the charge of falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code: The Court disagreed with the Ombudsman's findings. It explained that Article 171, par. 3 requires the attribution of statements other than those actually made, and crucially, requires criminal intent (mens rea). In this case, petitioner prepared the Letter of Administration based on Judge Pestaño's order approving the administrator's bond. The Court found that by approving the bond, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator, making the statement in the LOA that he was appointed administrator by order of the court dated October 12, 1998, substantially correct. There was no willful or felonious act, nor any corrupt motive, to warrant a prosecution for falsification. On the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court found no basis for the charge. The elements of the offense require proof of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court emphasized that petitioner performed a ministerial duty in preparing the Letter of Administration, substantially copying the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court, based on the dispositive portions of the court orders. While the LOA might have been inaccurate for omitting reference to the lease agreement, this omission, without evidence of dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, did not amount to gross negligence or corrupt motive. The Court stressed that the duties of a Clerk of Court are essentially ministerial, and using the prescribed form, even with minor inaccuracies, does not automatically equate to the corrupt practices defined in R.A. No. 3019.
Main Doctrine
A Clerk of Court who prepares a Letter of Administration based on the dispositive portion of a court order, even if it omits certain details like a lease agreement mentioned in the body of the order, is not necessarily guilty of falsification or violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act if she acted ministerially and without criminal intent or bad faith. The duty of a Clerk of Court in issuing such documents is ministerial, and deviation from the prescribed form or omission of certain details, without corrupt motive, does not automatically constitute a crime.