Marvin Mercado v. People of the Philippines
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Marvin Mercado and his co-accused were charged with and convicted of violating R.A. 6538, The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. The underlying incident involved the theft of an Isuzu Trooper, which was parked by its user, Leonardo Bhagwani. The vehicle was reported missing, and subsequent investigation led to the admission by Mercado's co-accused that they had taken the vehicle for a trip to Laguna, La Union, and Baguio, claiming it was with Bhagwani's consent. Mercado's participation was narrated by his co-accused, though he was absent during a confrontation. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court convicted Marvin Mercado and his co-accused for violating R.A. 6538, sentencing them to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. The present case before the Supreme Court concerns Marvin Mercado's petition for review of this decision. The Petition: Petitioner Marvin Mercado assails his conviction and the increased penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. He argues that the Court of Appeals should have certified the case to the Supreme Court because the increased penalty of thirty (30) years was equivalent to reclusion perpetua, which, under Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires certification to the Supreme Court. Mercado also raises the issue of whether a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act indeed occurred, contending the vehicle was taken for a joyride rather than with intent to steal. The Supreme Court, however, notes that the factual issue of violation is not proper for a petition for review on certiorari, which is limited to questions of law.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not certifying the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, given the penalty imposed. Whether the accused violated the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the motion and manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado, with a modification on the penalty imposed. The Court ruled that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was not reclusion perpetua for the purposes of mandatory certification to the Supreme Court under Sec. 13, Rule 124. The Court also found that the evidence sufficiently established a violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The penalty was modified to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.
Ratio Decidendi
On the procedural issue of certification to the Supreme Court: The Court held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by the petitioner, is applicable only when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124. The Court clarified that reclusion perpetua, as defined in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, is a single indivisible penalty. Furthermore, R.A. 6538 is a special penal law, and its penalties are not necessarily taken from or refer to those in the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for carnapping under R.A. 6538, even with the qualifying circumstance of force upon things, does not correspond to reclusion perpetua unless the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped, which is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. Therefore, the appeal to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which limits the review to questions of law, was the proper mode of appeal. On the issue of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act: The Court found that the issue of whether there was a violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act was a factual issue. The Court reiterated the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court, unless there are grounds to apply exceptions, which were not present in this case. The evidence showed that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access, demonstrating the use of force upon the vehicle, which is a qualifying circumstance under R.A. 6538. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the accused were motivated by fun rather than theft, noting that the act of taking the vehicle without the owner's consent and using force to gain entry constituted carnapping. The Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the imposition of the penalty, finding that while force was used, the full penalty might not be warranted, and thus modified the penalty with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Main Doctrine
The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, even if it falls within the range of reclusion perpetua, does not automatically require certification to the Supreme Court if it is imposed under a special penal law that does not define reclusion perpetua as a single indivisible penalty for the offense, and the appeal is brought via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which limits the review to questions of law.