Lingating v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the eligibility of Cesar B. Sulong to run for mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner Miguel M. Lingating alleged that Sulong was disqualified under Section 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) because he had been removed from office as mayor in a prior administrative case (AC No. 12-91). This administrative case, filed in 1991, resulted in a decision by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur on February 4, 1992, finding Sulong guilty of various offenses, including dishonesty and malversation, and ordering his removal from office. Sulong, however, contested the finality of this decision, claiming he had filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal which remained unresolved. Procedural History: Petitioner Lingating filed a petition for disqualification against Sulong with the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 3, 2001. The COMELEC's First Division initially granted the petition and disqualified Sulong in a resolution dated August 1, 2001, citing the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decision as a ground for disqualification. Sulong moved for reconsideration, presenting a certification that the decision had not become final and executory. Lingating opposed this motion and also sought the execution of the First Division's resolution. On April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division's resolution, finding that Sulong's subsequent re-elections in 1992 and 1995 rendered the administrative case moot and academic, and thus dismissed the petition for disqualification. The Petition: This case is a petition for certiorari filed by Atty. Miguel M. Lingating seeking to annul the April 4, 2002 resolution of the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the doctrine of condonation through re-election as established in Aguinaldo v. Santos, contending that the ruling in Reyes v. Commission on Elections is more applicable. Lingating asserts that Sulong's administrative case had become final and executory, making him disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, and that his re-election did not cure this disqualification. The petition specifically challenges the COMELEC en banc's conclusion that the administrative decision had not become final and executory and its subsequent dismissal of the disqualification petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos to hold that the re-election of respondent Sulong in 1992 and 1995 rendered the administrative case moot and academic, thereby condoning the alleged misconduct; and whether the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory, thus disqualifying respondent Sulong under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, which dismissed the petition for disqualification against respondent Cesar B. Sulong. The Court found that respondent Sulong was not disqualified from running for mayor.
Ratio Decidendi
On the effect of re-election and condonation and the finality of the administrative decision and its effect on disqualification: The Court distinguished the present case from Reyes v. Commission on Elections. In Aguinaldo v. Santos, re-election was held to render an administrative case moot and academic, cutting off the right to remove an official for misconduct in a prior term. The COMELEC en banc applied this principle, stating that Sulong's re-election in 1992 and 1995 would be tantamount to condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decision, assuming it had become final and executory. The Court noted that the people of Lapuyan had expressed their will by voting for Sulong in the recent elections. The Court also pointed out that the succession of the vice-mayor and municipal councilor to the mayoralty appeared to be pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory, but this did not prove the finality of the decision itself, especially in light of the pending motion for reconsideration. The Court found that the decision in AC No. 12-91, rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur on February 4, 1992, had not become final and executory. Respondent Sulong had filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal on February 18, 1992, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had required the complainant to comment. The records indicated that the complainant had not filed the comment, and the motion remained unresolved. The Court held that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, even if not explicitly provided for in the relevant rules, should be permitted to allow the agency an opportunity to correct errors. Therefore, there was no final decision finding respondent Sulong guilty to speak of. The Court considered it unfair to disqualify an elected candidate after the electorate had already cast their votes, especially when the administrative decision was rendered nearly ten years prior and its finality was still in question due to a pending motion for reconsideration. The Court emphasized that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve the motion contributed to this unfairness. Consequently, the Court found no basis to disqualify respondent Sulong.
Main Doctrine
Re-election to another term may render an administrative case moot and academic, thereby negating disqualification under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, especially if the administrative decision has not become final and executory due to pending motions.