Bello v. Diaz
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Silvestre H. Bello III, then Solicitor General, filed a letter-complaint against Judge Augustus C. Diaz for Rendering an Unjust Decision in Civil Case No. 37-17388, and against Deputy Sheriff Efren P. Luna for Grave Abuse of Authority. In the said civil case, Judge Diaz ordered Victor S. Clavel and "all persons claiming rights under him, or whoever is found in possession of subject properties" to vacate Lots 8 and 10 and restore possession to the plaintiffs, Spouses Jose B. Luriz and Amelia M. Luriz. Upon motion for immediate execution, Judge Diaz issued an order granting the writ, which was implemented by Deputy Sheriff Luna against the Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC) and its personnel. 2. Procedural History: Complainant alleged that the decision was unjust because POC, the owner, was not impleaded. Judge Diaz countered that POC was claiming rights under Clavel, the Administrator, and that the phrase used in the decision was in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. He also argued that the OSG, which represented Clavel, had previously treated the case as a government case. Judge Diaz asserted that the assailed orders were issued after proper notice and that the complaint should have been an appeal. He also noted that the decision was elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (Civil Case No. Q-97-32730). The OCA recommended dismissal for lack of merit, deeming the administrative complaint premature as the questioned decision was under appeal. The Supreme Court directed the OCA to hold action until the RTC case was resolved. The RTC dismissed for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, upholding Judge Diaz's decision. However, the decision in the RTC case was appealed to the Court of Appeals and was still pending resolution. The OCA reiterated its recommendation for dismissal. 3. The Petition: The complainant charged Judge Diaz with rendering an unjust decision and Deputy Sheriff Luna with grave abuse of authority for implementing the writ of execution. The complainant argued that the ejectment case was personal against Clavel, and POC was not a party. The implementation of the writ against POC and its personnel caused prejudice and irreparable damage to the government and POC.
Issue(s)
Whether the administrative complaint against respondent Judge is premature. Whether respondent Deputy Sheriff committed grave abuse of authority in implementing the writ of execution.
Ruling
The complaint against Judge Augustus C. Diaz is DISMISSED for being premature. The complaint against Deputy Sheriff Efren P. Luna is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prematurity of the administrative complaint against respondent Judge: The Supreme Court reiterated the dictum that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. The established doctrine and policy is that administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. In this case, the complainant had utilized the available judicial remedy of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the RTC, and had further elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, a decision on the propriety of the judge's decision in the administrative proceeding would be premature. The complainant, in effect, abused court processes by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary action even before the judicial remedies were settled. The Court emphasized that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith, and prosecution can only be had if there is a final declaration by a competent court of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, coupled with evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance, or inexcusable negligence. On the issue of respondent Deputy Sheriff's grave abuse of authority: The Supreme Court held that a sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision, and unless restrained by a court order to the contrary, sheriffs should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. In this case, respondent Deputy Sheriff merely acted within the mandates of his authority by implementing the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge. He was performing his official duty and therefore should not be held accountable for the implementation of the writ.
Main Doctrine
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. A sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial.