Spouses Alfarero v. Spouses Sevilla
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondents Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla were the registered owners of a parcel of land. On May 25, 1986, they executed a Deed of Sale for a portion of this land to petitioners Spouses Shem G. Alfarero and Aurelia Tagalog, Spouses Gines G. Alfarero and Noni Cruspero, and Naomi G. Alfarero, for P12,000.00. This Deed of Sale was notarized and registered, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49928 in the petitioners' names, with an inscribed limitation allowing repurchase within five years from the date of conveyance. Respondents claimed to have offered to repurchase the land in October 1986, but petitioners allegedly objected. On January 3, 1991, respondents filed an action to repurchase the property. 2. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Branch 4, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents), ordering the defendants (petitioners) to reconvey the property upon payment of P12,000.00 plus legal interest, and awarding attorney's fees. The RTC found the notarized Deed of Sale dated May 25, 1986, to be controlling. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA gave more evidentiary weight to the notarized Deed of Sale dated May 25, 1986, over the unnotarized Deed of Sale offered by petitioners, which allegedly indicated a sale in December 1985. The CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 3. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, questioning the CA's ruling on the date of conveyance and the denial of their Motion for New Trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that the date of execution in the notarized Deed of Sale was controlling for the purpose of counting the five-year period of repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue (Date of Conveyance and Evidentiary Weight): The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error of law. The Court reiterated the well-established rule that a public document, such as a notarized deed of sale, is entitled to greater evidentiary weight than a private document. The notarized Deed of Sale executed on May 25, 1986, clearly indicated this date as the date of conveyance. Petitioners' claim of a December 1985 sale was based on an unnotarized document whose authenticity and date of execution were not definitively proven. Furthermore, the petitioners, by moving for a judgment on the pleadings at the pre-trial stage, had the burden of proving their affirmative defense of prescription but failed to present evidence to categorically establish the December 1985 sale. Their failure to present clear and convincing evidence to contradict the presumption of regularity of the notarized public document meant that the date of May 25, 1986, as stated in the notarized deed, was correctly considered by the appellate court as the date of conveyance for the purpose of computing the five-year repurchase period under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. On the second issue (Motion for New Trial): The Supreme Court found the second query moot and academic and affirmed the denial of the Motion for New Trial. Rule 37, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that a motion for new trial must be filed "within the period for taking an appeal." The petitioners filed their motion after the appellate court had rendered its decision on appeal, which is beyond the reglementary period. While a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence can be filed after judgment, it must still be within the period for perfecting an appeal. Moreover, the issue regarding the alleged newly discovered evidence was not raised in the proceedings at the first instance, and as a general rule, points of law or theories not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, based on basic considerations of due process. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the motion.
Main Doctrine
A notarized deed of sale carries greater evidentiary weight than an unnotarized one, and the date of execution in a notarized document is controlling for purposes of computing the period of repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended. A motion for new trial must be filed within the period for taking an appeal.