Lahom v. Sibulo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, unable to have children of their own, took in Isabelita's nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo, at the age of two and raised him as their son. They filed a petition for adoption in 1971, which was granted on May 5, 1972, leading to the change of Jose Melvin's surname to Lahom. Years later, a rift developed between the adoptive mother, Isabelita, and Jose Melvin. Isabelita alleged that Jose Melvin refused to change his surname to Lahom, continued to use Sibulo professionally and in his dealings, and showed indifference to her needs, particularly during her frequent medical check-ups. She also claimed Jose Melvin was motivated by a desire for their properties, evidenced by his filing of a partition case against her. 2. Procedural History: In December 1999, Isabelita Lahom filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City, seeking to rescind the decree of adoption. Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that he had no cause of action due to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act, which took effect on March 22, 1998, and deleted the right of adopters to rescind adoption decrees. The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that while it had jurisdiction as a Family Court, the petition lacked a cause of action under R.A. No. 8552. The court also found that even if the right to rescind existed under prior laws, the action had prescribed, as the grounds were known to the petitioner for more than five years before filing the case. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Isabelita S. Lahom filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, raising two main issues: (1) whether the adoption decreed in 1972 could still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and (2) if so, whether the adopter's action had prescribed. The petitioner argued that her right to rescind, vested under the Civil Code and Family Code, should not be adversely affected by R.A. No. 8552 and that the trial court retained jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the RTC's decision, holding that the action for rescission was filed after R.A. No. 8552 came into force, which withdrew the right of adopters to rescind adoption decrees, and that even under prior rules, the action had prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the adoption decree, granted in 1972, can still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552. Whether the adopter's action for rescission has prescribed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the petition for rescission of adoption. The Court held that the right to rescind an adoption decree was withdrawn by Republic Act No. 8552, and an action filed after its effectivity could not prosper. Furthermore, even under prior laws, the action would have prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of rescission under R.A. No. 8552 and vested rights/retroactivity: The Court held that Republic Act No. 8552, enacted on March 22, 1998, deleted the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 explicitly states that adoption shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s), although adopters may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. Since the petitioner filed her action in December 1999, after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, her petition could no longer be pursued under the new law. The Court emphasized that the law must be applied as written, even if it results in a situation where an adoption, once finalized, cannot be undone by the adopter. The petitioner argued that R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply to her case, as her right to rescind was vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code. However, the Court clarified the concept of a "vested right" as a "present fixed interest" protected against arbitrary state action. The Court cited previous rulings in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Republic vs. Miller, where it held that jurisdiction and rights are determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In this case, the action for rescission was filed after R.A. No. 8552 took effect, thus the new law governed. The Court also noted that a "right of action" given by statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised, and that the privilege to adopt is not a fundamental right but a statutory creation subject to state regulation. On the issue of prescription: Even if the petitioner's right to rescind were to be considered under the prior laws, the Court found that her action had prescribed. The RTC correctly pointed out that the grounds for rescission, as alleged in the petition, were known to the petitioner for more than five years prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999. Section 5, Rule 100 of the Revised Rules of Court provided a five-year bar rule for setting aside an adoption. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that must be met, and failure to do so extinguishes the right to pursue the action. Therefore, the petitioner's claim was barred by prescription, irrespective of the effect of R.A. No. 8552.
Main Doctrine
The right to rescind an adoption decree, which was available under the Civil Code and the Family Code, was withdrawn by Republic Act No. 8552. An action for rescission filed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 cannot prosper, as the right to rescind is no longer recognized, and any such action would be subject to prescription if not filed within the period allowed by law.