Leon v. Nepomuceno
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In an election contest proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, judgment was rendered ordering that "Las costas y gastos de la protesta se pagaran por el protestado y tercerista" (The costs and expenses of the contest will be paid by the protestee and the intervener). Procedural History: This judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court and was affirmed, including the provision for costs and expenses. The record was returned to the Court of First Instance, and the judgment became final and unappealable. The Petition: The protestee alleged that the sheriff, with the approval of the respondent judge, was proceeding to enforce the judgment as a "joint and several" judgment, rather than a merely "joint" judgment, and prayed for a writ of prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the judgment as a "joint and several" obligation.
Issue(s)
Whether the judgment for costs and expenses in an election contest, as worded, constitutes a "joint and several" judgment or merely a "joint" judgment. Whether the Supreme Court can entertain contentions regarding the nature and extent of the authority of courts to tax costs against third persons in election contests when the judgment has become final and unappealable.
Ruling
The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer and directed the respondents to refrain from enforcing the judgment for costs and expenses as a "joint and several" judgment. The Court ordered the respondent judge to revoke any orders enforcing the judgment as "joint and several" and to tax the costs of the prohibition proceedings against the respondent sheriff.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the judgment is "joint and several" or "joint": The Court held that the language of the judgment, "Las costas y gastos de la protesta se pagaran por el protestado y tercerista," is manifestly a joint judgment and does not permit construction as a "joint and several" judgment. The Court cited Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code, which establish that a concurrence of two or more debtors in a single obligation does not imply that each is bound to comply with the whole obligation unless the obligation expressly constitutes it as a joint and several obligation. In the absence of such express stipulation, the credit or debt is presumed to be divided into as many equal parts as there are creditors or debtors. On the issue of whether contentions regarding the taxation of costs can be raised after the judgment has become final: The Court stated that it was not necessary to decide the contentions raised regarding the nature and extent of the authority of courts to tax costs against third persons in election contests. The only question before the Court was whether the judgment actually entered and affirmed was "joint and several." The Court emphasized that since the judgment had become final and unappealable, the parties could not be heard to argue that a different judgment should have been entered. Such contentions, if valid, should have been raised while the judgment was open for reconsideration or on appeal.
Main Doctrine
A judgment for costs in an election contest, which explicitly states that costs shall be paid by the 'protestado y tercerista' (protestee and intervener), is a joint judgment and not a joint and several judgment, absent express stipulation to the contrary, as provided by Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.