Lagrosa v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for possessing forest products without requisite permits. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Procedural History: Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed their conviction but modified the penalty to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. The CA decision became final and executory. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the RTC, which was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the RTC's denial. Hence, the present petition for review. The Petition: Petitioners argued that Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, is absurd because they were not given the opportunity to apply for probation when convicted by the RTC as the penalty imposed was more than six years. They claimed their first opportunity to apply for probation was after the CA modified the sentence to a probationable range. They also argued that the ruling in Francisco v. CA was not applicable to their case.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioners are eligible to apply for probation after perfecting an appeal from the RTC decision, despite the modification of the sentence by the Court of Appeals to a probationable range. Whether the appeal perfected by the petitioners was solely for the purpose of reducing the penalty to a probationable range.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial of petitioners' Application for Probation is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of eligibility for probation after perfecting an appeal: The Court reiterated that Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, explicitly states that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The fact that the petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court is sufficient ground to deny their application for probation. The Court emphasized that by perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law. The purpose of this provision is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation but does so only after failing in his appeal. The Court noted that the law makes no distinction whether the appeal was for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty or for questioning the merits of the conviction. On whether the appeal was solely to reduce the penalty: The Court found that the petitioners were not candid in their assertion that their appeal was solely to correct an erroneous penalty. Their appellant's brief filed in the Court of Appeals raised assignments of error that questioned the merits of their conviction, specifically stating that the lower court erred in finding them guilty because the evidence against them lacked moral certainty. The Court held that by putting the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal, petitioners asserted their guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. Therefore, their claim of appealing only to reduce the penalty to a probationable range was belied by the records of their appeal, precluding them from seeking probation.
Main Doctrine
An accused who perfects an appeal from a judgment of conviction, even if the penalty imposed is initially non-probationable, is precluded from applying for probation after the appellate court modifies the sentence to a probationable range, especially when the appeal also questioned the merits of the conviction.