Hegerty v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Allan Nash alleged that petitioner Rodney Hegerty, along with the deceased Don Judevine and James Studenski, induced him to invest in a foreign exchange scheme promising a 10.45% annual return. Between July 1992 and November 28, 1997, Nash invested a total of US$236,353.34. In December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that his investments were lost due to being lent to Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., a company in which Hegerty was a stockholder. Hegerty's initial offer to return half the investment was later withdrawn. After his demands were ignored, Nash filed a complaint-affidavit against Hegerty for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Procedural History: The City Prosecutor of Manila dismissed the estafa complaint against Hegerty for insufficiency of evidence. Nash's counsel received this resolution on June 16, 1999. A motion for reconsideration was filed on June 28, 1999, and denied on May 8, 2000, when Nash himself received the resolution. Nash filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on May 19, 2000, which was dismissed for being filed out of time. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied for being filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Nash then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his appeal and motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversing the DOJ's resolutions and directing the prosecution of Hegerty for estafa. The Petition: Petitioner Rodney Hegerty seeks to annul the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction because Nash's appeal to the DOJ and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were filed out of time, rendering the prosecutor's resolution final and executory. Hegerty contends that without jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals could not validly order his prosecution. He argues that the City Prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, as there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for estafa. The petition further questions whether the Court of Appeals may order prosecution without jurisdiction and in the absence of grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutor.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over a case where the appeal to the Department of Justice was filed out of time. Whether the Court of Appeals, acting without jurisdiction, may order the prosecution of a criminal case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila dismissing the complaint for estafa against petitioner, as well as the Resolution of the Department of Justice which denied respondent's appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the timeliness of the appeal to the Department of Justice: The Supreme Court found that respondent Nash's appeal to the Department of Justice was filed out of time. Under DOJ Order No. 223, an appeal must be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution, which period is interrupted by a motion for reconsideration filed within ten (10) days. The period then continues to run from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Nash's counsel received the City Prosecutor's resolution on June 16, 1999. The motion for reconsideration was filed on June 28, 1999 (the 10th day falling on a Saturday). Nash received the resolution denying the motion on May 8, 2000. Under the rule, he had only five (5) remaining days to appeal, meaning his deadline was May 15, 2000. His appeal filed on May 19, 2000, was therefore clearly out of time. The Court also clarified that service of resolutions can be made upon the party or his counsel, as expressly provided by the DOJ rule, and that Nash's argument regarding invalid service was without merit. On the issue of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals' authority to order prosecution: The Supreme Court held that its duty in a certiorari case is to determine if the executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that an investigating prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification or sufficient evidence of guilt has been presented. The determination of probable cause is an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. In this case, the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa due to an "utter and absolute absence of a showing that the respondent partook of the said investments nor had any business dealing with either the late DON JUDEVINE or the complainant." The Court found no evidence that the City Prosecutor gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the dismissal and ordering the prosecution, as it acted without jurisdiction when the appeal to the DOJ was filed out of time.
Main Doctrine
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. A writ of certiorari to annul a dismissal resolution is warranted only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Furthermore, appeals from resolutions of the prosecutor must be filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the Department of Justice.