De Joya v. Jail Warden
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Norma de Joya, was charged with two separate violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Batangas City. In Criminal Case No. 25484, she was accused of issuing a postdated Solid Bank Check for P150,000.00 to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, which was dishonored due to a closed account. In Criminal Case No. 25773, she was accused of issuing a postdated Security Bank and Trust Company Check for P225,000.00 to Resurreccion T. Castillo, which was also dishonored due to a closed account. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges. 2. Procedural History: While the trials were ongoing, the petitioner absconded and failed to present any evidence in her defense. Consequently, she was convicted in absentia in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 25484, she was sentenced to one year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify the offended party P150,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 25773, she was sentenced to one year imprisonment and ordered to pay P225,000.00 in damages. The petitioner did not file any appeals from these decisions. Approximately five years after her convictions, she was arrested while applying for an NBI clearance and was detained at the Batangas City Jail. She subsequently filed a motion with the trial court seeking retroactive application of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, arguing for her release. The trial court denied this motion, stating that its decisions had become final and executory and that the circular was not applicable to her case. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Norma de Joya filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking her release from detention. She argued that Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as modified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, deleted the penalty of imprisonment for BP 22 violations, allowing only the imposition of a fine, and that this circular should be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the petition, asserting that the judgments of conviction had long attained finality and could not be modified, and that the administrative circulars did not eliminate the penalty of imprisonment for BP 22 cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus despite being detained under a final and executory judgment of conviction. Whether Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as modified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, should be applied retroactively to her case pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of habeas corpus: The Court held that a writ of habeas corpus is not available when the person is detained under a process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, provided the court had jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to final judgments of conviction for violations of BP 22. Therefore, her detention was lawful, and she was not entitled to the writ. Her reliance on cases allowing benefit from reduced penalties was misplaced because those cases did not involve detention under final judgments that had already attained finality and executory status. The fundamental principle is that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review or correct errors of law or fact committed by a court of competent jurisdiction, especially when the judgment has become final and executory. The petitioner's claim of illegality of detention was based on a post-conviction administrative issuance, not a jurisdictional defect. On the retroactivity of SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000: The Court clarified that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, and thus, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which deals with retroactivity of penal laws, is inapplicable. The circular was intended to apply only to cases pending as of its effectivity date and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Furthermore, SC Admin. Circ. No. 13-2001 explained that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 did not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for BP 22 violations but merely laid down a rule of preference in its application. It urged judges to consider the circumstances of the offense and the offender, such as good faith or clear mistake of fact without negligence, to determine if a fine alone would be more appropriate. However, the determination of whether imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty rests solely with the judge's sound discretion. The circular does not amend BP 22, nor does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law. The courts retain discretion to impose imprisonment, a fine, or both, as provided by BP 22. The petitioner's failure to offer evidence during trial, remaining at large for five years, and the finality of the judgments rendered her plea for retroactive application of the circular without basis.
Main Doctrine
A writ of habeas corpus is not available to assail a detention based on a final and executory judgment of conviction, even if the petitioner seeks the retroactive application of a subsequent administrative circular that modifies the penalty, as such circular does not amend substantive law and applies only to pending cases, not those already terminated by final judgment.