Office of the Court Administrator v. Pe
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This administrative matter concerns the habitual tardiness of Rosemarie B. Pe (Pe), Statistician II, Regional Trial Court-Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City. A certification showed that Pe incurred tardiness 17 times in May 2002, 11 times in June 2002, 13 times in July 2002, 20 times in August 2002, 20 times in September 2002, 19 times in January 2003, 17 times in February 2003, and 20 times in March 2003. Procedural History: Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño directed Pe to explain in writing why she should not be administratively sanctioned for habitual tardiness. Pe explained that her tardiness was due to her pregnancy, citing common physiological and biological changes experienced by pregnant women. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Pe be reprimanded and warned, opining that a health condition is not a sufficient justification to excuse habitual tardiness, citing A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC. The Petition: The case reached the Supreme Court for resolution on the appropriate penalty for Pe's habitual tardiness.
Issue(s)
Whether Rosemarie B. Pe's habitual tardiness is sufficiently excused by her pregnancy. Whether the penalty of reprimand is sufficient for habitual tardiness committed over two years.
Ruling
Rosemarie B. Pe is found GUILTY of habitual tardiness. She is SUSPENDED for twenty (20) days with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. A copy of the Resolution is to be attached to her 201 Files. The Office of the Court Administrator is advised to file administrative charges as soon as habitual tardiness is incurred.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Rosemarie B. Pe's habitual tardiness is sufficiently excused by her pregnancy: The Court held that while Pe's pregnancy and subsequent motherhood may have presented difficulties, these circumstances do not completely excuse her habitual tardiness. The Court noted that Pe continued to incur numerous instances of tardiness from January to March 2003, even after her pregnancy terminated in October 2002. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that personal circumstances such as health concerns, domestic, and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to completely excuse habitual tardiness, although they may be considered to mitigate administrative liability. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, which defines habitual tardiness, applies without distinction to all government employees, requiring strict observance of official time. The Court reiterated its stance that punctuality is a virtue, and absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible for public servants who are expected to be role models in observing prescribed office hours and using every moment for public service. On whether the penalty of reprimand is sufficient for habitual tardiness committed over two years: The Court found the OCA's recommended penalty of reprimand insufficient given the extent of Pe's habitual tardiness. The records showed that Pe was habitually tardy for two consecutive years, exceeding the threshold of ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or two consecutive months during the year, as defined by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998. Specifically, she committed habitual tardiness in May, July, August, and September 2002, and in January, February, and March 2003. According to Section 52(C)(4), Rule VI of Civil Service Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, the second offense of habitual tardiness warrants suspension for 1 to 30 days. Considering Pe's eight years of government service and lack of prior administrative charges, the Court deemed a suspension of twenty (20) days as the appropriate penalty, which is stiffer than a mere reprimand.
Main Doctrine
Habitual tardiness, as defined by Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, is a violation of the duty of public servants to observe official time and uphold the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. Personal circumstances such as pregnancy, while potentially mitigating, do not completely excuse habitual tardiness, and repeated offenses warrant penalties stiffer than a mere reprimand, including suspension.