Mon v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Henry L. Mon filed an affidavit-complaint for ejectment against Spouses Larry and Jovita Velasco, alleging that the Spouses Velasco stole a sack of palay and subleased the land they were cultivating. Petitioner claimed ownership and administration of the land. Procedural History: The Regional Office ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering the Spouses Velasco to vacate the land, finding that they had subleased the land in violation of Section 27(2) of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844). The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office reversed this, remanding the case for determination of lease rentals and reliquidation of harvests, noting that agrarian laws abolished share tenancy and only leasehold is allowed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB's decision. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that it committed grave abuse of discretion in adopting the posture that he changed his theory of the case and erred in affirming the DARAB's decision which dismissed the Regional Office's findings.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in adopting the posture that petitioner changed the theory of the case on appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DARAB Central Office's decision and dismissing the findings of the DARAB Regional Adjudication Office.
Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of changing the theory of the case: The Supreme Court held that petitioner could not change his theory of the case on appeal. Petitioner's stance before the Court of Appeals was that the Civil Code lease provisions applied, which would allow subleasing unless expressly prohibited. However, the case was filed before the DARAB, indicating it was a dispute between an agricultural landlord and tenant, not a civil law lessor and lessee. Invoking subletting as a prohibited act under RA 3844, while simultaneously arguing for Civil Code lease provisions, constituted a change in theory. The Court emphasized that a party cannot change their theory of the case on appeal, as this violates fundamental tenets of fair play and deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to address the new issue. Furthermore, under Civil Code lease provisions, subleasing is generally permitted unless expressly prohibited, which petitioner failed to allege or prove. On the issue of disregarding the ejectment and affirming the DARAB's ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the DARAB's reversal of the Regional Office's order. The Court reiterated that agrarian laws, specifically RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389, abolished share tenancy and declared it contrary to public policy, mandating conversion to agricultural leasehold. The DARAB correctly noted that petitioner's insistence on a 50-50 share division perpetuated an illegal act. The Court applied the equity principle that one who seeks relief must come with clean hands. Petitioner could not invoke Section 27(2) of RA 3844 prohibiting subletting when he himself violated Sections 4 and 5 of the same law by perpetuating share tenancy. The Court affirmed the remand to the DAR Provincial Adjudicator to determine and fix lease rentals in accordance with RA 3844, which mandates that rentals shall not exceed 25% of the average normal harvest.
Main Doctrine
A party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. The Supreme Court also held that a landowner cannot invoke a provision prohibiting subletting under Republic Act No. 3844 when the landowner himself violated provisions of the same law outlawing share tenancy, applying the equity principle that one who comes to court must do so with clean hands.