Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Leonardo P. Dimaculangan filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. and spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon. Respondent alleged that petitioners engaged his services as a geodetic surveyor in 1967-1968 to subdivide two parcels of land in Batangas. As payment, petitioners agreed to give him one subdivision lot (Lot 19, Block 17) and P9,200.00 in cash. Respondent completed the work, received the cash payment in installments, and was given possession of the lot. However, petitioners failed to deliver the title to the lot despite demands. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing prescription, improper venue, statute of frauds, and failure to state a cause of action. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint for improper venue. Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC, after granting its judge's inhibition and re-raffling the case, reversed its dismissal order, holding that the action was personal and thus venue was proper in Quezon City where respondent resided. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, petitioners filed unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases against respondent's lot buyers in Batangas. Respondent then sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction from the RTC, which the latter granted, enjoining petitioners and the MTC of Rosario, Batangas, from proceeding with the unlawful detainer cases. Petitioners' motion to lift the TRO and for inhibition was denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC's orders regarding venue, injunction, and denial of inhibition. The Petition: The CA partially nullified the RTC's October 20, 1995 order (insofar as it issued the TRO and preliminary injunction) and the June 5, 1996 order (insofar as it set the case for pre-trial). The CA ordered the RTC to desist from further proceedings until petitioners filed their answer. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent’s complaint is a personal action and thus the venue was proper. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for inhibition.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue (nature of the action and venue): The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the respondent's complaint was a personal action for specific performance. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter and the nature of an action are determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this case, the respondent's allegations clearly indicated that he was seeking the delivery of the title to the lot, which he was already possessing, as payment for his services. He did not allege seeking to recover possession or ownership of the lot itself. Therefore, as a personal action, venue was correctly laid in the RTC of Quezon City, where the respondent resided, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court distinguished this case from Espineli v. Santiago, where ownership was explicitly put in issue. On the second issue (denial of inhibition): The Court sustained the Court of Appeals' ruling that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for inhibition. The Court reiterated that judges' inhibition rests on their sound discretion and requires proof of bias or prejudice with clear and convincing evidence, not mere allegations. While the CA found that the judge exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the injunction against the MTC of Batangas, it clarified that such an error, correctible by certiorari, did not necessarily warrant inhibition. The Court found no sufficient basis to brand the judge as biased or partial based on the presented facts.
Main Doctrine
The venue of an action for specific performance, even if it involves a parcel of land, is properly laid in the place where the plaintiff resides if the action primarily seeks the delivery of the title to the property and not the recovery of possession or ownership thereof, as such action is considered personal.