Caballes v. Perez-Sison
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute arose from a complaint filed by Charlie L. Ho, President of the Samahan ng Mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), with the Board of Optometry of the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The complaint charged Emma Emperado-Dreyfus, Ma. Teresita C. Caballes, Filemon P. Esquivel, Jr., and Vladimir L. Ruidera, all employees of Vision Express Philippines, Inc. (VEPI), with unethical and unprofessional conduct. Specifically, the charge alleged that these optometrists may have violated Section 3(e) of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists by holding themselves out to the public as optometrists under the name of a corporation (VEPI) rather than their own names, and by allegedly participating in the corporation's potentially illegal practice of optometry. Procedural History: Following the filing of the complaint and supporting affidavits, the respondents, including petitioners Caballes and Ruidera, submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit. Subsequently, Caballes and Ruidera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them. The Board of Optometry denied this motion, finding it without basis and stating that the issue of whether their employment constituted unethical conduct was a matter to be proven. A motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was also denied. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the Board's orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition, holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not subject to certiorari, and that the petitioners should have proceeded to trial. The appellate court also found no grave abuse of discretion by the Board. The Petition: The petitioners, Ma. Teresita C. Caballes and Vladimir Ruidera, seek certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' dismissal of their petition and its resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Board of Optometry did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners contend that the original complaint patently failed to state a cause of action against them, as it did not clearly allege specific acts constituting unethical or unprofessional conduct, merely stating their employment with VEPI. They also assert that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not subject to certiorari, and that the appellate court's decision sets a bad precedent by implying that mere employment in a corporation can be grounds for disciplinary action, violating due process and equal protection.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari when the complaint filed against the petitioners patently failed to state a cause of action. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39494 and its Resolution dated October 22, 1997 are affirmed in toto.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari when the complaint filed against the petitioners patently failed to state a cause of action: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the allegations in the complaint. The Court emphasized that the sole element furnishing the test of sufficiency is usually the complaint itself. The absence of proof to substantiate an allegation does not mean the complaint is insufficient, but merely that it is unsupported by evidence, which is a matter for determination after trial. Therefore, at the stage of a motion to dismiss, the Board could not be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying it. The petitioners' argument that the complaint did not specify their acts constituting unethical conduct was deemed premature, as the Board's role was to determine the merits after affording the parties an opportunity to present evidence. The Court reiterated that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a rigid or technical sense, especially in administrative proceedings. On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65: The Supreme Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely an interlocutory order and, as such, is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to appeal in due course, assigning the denial of the motion to dismiss as an error. While certiorari may be availed of in cases of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, it would be a breach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come before the appellate court every time an order is issued with which a party does not agree. The petitioners failed to show that the instant case fell under any recognized exceptions to this rule, nor did they demonstrate that the respondent Board committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. The Court stressed the importance of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, allowing administrative agencies to carry out their functions before resorting to judicial intervention.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and not appealable; neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari, as such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial, unless it falls under recognized exceptions such as grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.