Republic v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns allegations of corruption and graft in connection with the acquisition of sixteen (16) oil mills by UNICOM. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Ombudsman, initiated a preliminary investigation into potential violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code (Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade). The acquisition was purportedly made in accordance with Presidential Decree Nos. 961 and 1468, and Letter of Instruction No. 926, which respondents argued shielded them from prosecution. 2. Procedural History: The Ombudsman initially dismissed the Republic's complaint in OMB-0-90-2811, citing a lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and finding that the acts were done in accordance with existing laws without evident bad faith or malice. The Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the Ombudsman's resolution and compel the continuation of the preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court, in a decision dated September 23, 2002, granted the Republic's petition, nullified the Ombudsman's dismissal, and ordered the investigation to proceed. This resolution addresses motions for reconsideration filed by both private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the petitioner Republic. 3. The Petition: The motions for reconsideration challenge the Supreme Court's prior decision. Respondent Cojuangco argues that the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause was not overturned, that there is no evidentiary basis for the finding that the offense had not prescribed, and that the validity of PD Nos. 961 and 1468, and LOI 926, should preclude prosecution. He also raises a violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case. The Republic, on the other hand, assails the exclusion of Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as defendants. The Court denies both motions, affirming its prior ruling that the validity of the decrees does not shield respondents from prosecution for violations of R.A. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, that the offense had not prescribed, and that the right to speedy disposition was waived. The Court also upholds the exclusion of Regala and Concepcion, and orders the dismissal of the case against the deceased respondent, Maria Clara L. Lobregat.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court erred in not upholding the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause. Whether the offense charged had prescribed. Whether Presidential Decree Nos. 961 and 1468, and Letter of Instruction No. 926 precluded prosecution under R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether respondent Cojuangco's constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case was violated. Whether respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion should have been excluded as defendants.
Ruling
The Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The Court's Decision dated September 23, 2002, was modified to the effect that the charges against the deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat were ordered dismissed, and any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto were declared extinguished by reason of her death.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause: The Court reiterated that while the Ombudsman concluded there was "no sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief that violation of the Anti-Graft Law was committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof," this conclusion was premised on the finding that the acquisition of the oil mills was done in accordance with existing laws, not on the absence of evidence of the crime itself. The Court emphasized that the validity of LOI No. 926 and PD Nos. 961 and 1468 would not shield private respondents from criminal prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, especially if the transactions were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, caused undue injury, or involved personal gain. On prescription of the offense: The Court found no error in its previous finding that the offense had not prescribed. It clarified that the ten-year prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Applying the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, the complaint filed on March 2, 1990, was well within the prescriptive period. On the applicability of PD Nos. 961 and 1468, and LOI No. 926: The Court reiterated that these laws do not provide a blanket shield against prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court explained that while these decrees may have sanctioned the acquisition of the oil mills, it does not negate the possibility that such acquisition caused undue prejudice to the government or that private respondents had a material and personal interest in the transaction, which are acts defined as corrupt practices under R.A. No. 3019. On the violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases: The Court found this contention to be without merit. Citing Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that the concept of speedy disposition is relative and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, considering the length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice caused. In this case, respondent Cojuangco did nothing to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case from 1991 to 1997, which inaction amounts to a waiver of such right. Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent's right should not work against the people's equally important right to public justice, especially considering that the funds used were public funds. On the exclusion of respondents Regala and Concepcion: The Court found the Republic's motion bereft of merit. It reiterated its previous rulings in Regala vs. Sandiganbayan and Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the acts complained of were done in connection with legal services rendered, and that these respondents were not merely witnesses but co-principals who could invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination and the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. The Court found no compelling reason to reconsider its exclusion of these respondents.
Main Doctrine
The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates both criminal and civil liability ex delicto. A claim of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases may be deemed waived by inaction or silence during the pendency of the investigation.