Suyat, Jr. v. Torres
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a robbery incident that occurred on May 23, 1993. Following the arrest of the suspects, Randy Torres, Nelson Torres, Marlon Bonson, and Bernardo Bautista, a criminal complaint was filed. During the inquest, Bernardo Bautista admitted sole responsibility and exonerated the others. Despite this, a preliminary investigation proceeded. Imelda Torres, mother of Randy and Nelson and aunt of Marlon, approached Prosecutor Donato S. Suyat, Jr., who allegedly demanded P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against her relatives, eventually agreeing to P15,000.00. Procedural History: Following the alleged demand for money, Imelda Torres consulted her lawyer and was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). An entrapment operation was set up, and on June 9, 1993, Imelda Torres paid Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. P15,000.00 in his office. The NBI agents apprehended Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. with P9,000.00, and an additional P6,000.00 was found on his son. Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. was subsequently found positive for illegal drugs. An administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed with the Department of Justice, leading to a formal charge and preventive suspension. The Secretary of Justice recommended dismissal, which was concurred with by the Executive Secretary and approved by the President via Administrative Order No. 95. Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed multiple motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition, affirming the President's order. The Court of Appeals found that the petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and that, even if considered a petition for review, the petitioner was liable for grave misconduct. The Petition: Petitioner Donato S. Suyat, Jr. seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the appellate court erred in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the decision would render counter-affidavits useless, compel individuals under custodial investigation not to remain silent, and that the decision ignored allegations of irregularities in the issuance of Administrative Order No. 95. The Supreme Court, however, denied the petition, holding that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petition for certiorari was an inappropriate remedy as the administrative order had become final and executory. The Court further found that the issues raised by the petitioner constituted errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, and that the petition involved factual matters not reviewable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as an inappropriate remedy. Whether the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Administrative Order No. 95. Whether the findings of fact and the decision of the Court of Appeals are supported by the evidence on record. Whether the petitioner's invocation of the right to remain silent was properly considered. Whether the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration with the Office of the President suspended the period to appeal.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. Administrative Order No. 95 of the President had become final and executory when the petitioner filed his petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The errors ascribed to the Office of the President were errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. The issues raised in the petition were factual and not reviewable by this Court under Rule 45.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy: The Court affirmed the CA's ruling that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was an inappropriate remedy. The petitioner had a remedy of appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43, which he failed to file within the reglementary period. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of certiorari, as these remedies are mutually exclusive. The petitioner's attempt to use certiorari to nullify AO No. 95 was an attempt to substitute a lost remedy of appeal. On the finality of Administrative Order No. 95: The Court found that AO No. 95 had become final and executory. The petitioner received the order on December 14, 1993, and filed a timely motion for reconsideration. However, his second motion for reconsideration, filed after the denial of his first motion, was prohibited under Section 7 of AO No. 18, Series of 1987. This prohibited pleading did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order to the CA via a petition for review. Therefore, when the petitioner filed his petition for certiorari, AO No. 95 was beyond the CA's jurisdiction to alter or reverse. On the factual nature of the issues: The Court emphasized that under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. The petitioner's issues involved an examination of the probative value of evidence, making them factual in nature. Findings of fact by quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the Supreme Court unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown. The petitioner failed to preponderantly establish such abuse. On the right to remain silent: The Court agreed with the CA's observation that the petitioner's invocation of the right to remain silent was immaterial given the quantum of proof for grave misconduct. The right to remain silent is to protect against forced confessions or incriminating statements. The petitioner's claim of being framed up was not incriminating but exculpatory. Instead of remaining silent, he should have seized the NBI investigation to denounce the alleged frame-up. His belated claim was found implausible, and his silence did not justify an incredible defense. On the effect of the second motion for reconsideration: The Court found that AO No. 95 had become final and executory because the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period to appeal.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal, and it cannot be used to correct errors of judgment, only errors of jurisdiction. Furthermore, a second motion for reconsideration of a final order of the Office of the President is prohibited and does not suspend the period to appeal.