Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Ombudsman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through its Chairman, headed the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans created to inventory behest loans, identify responsible parties, and recommend recovery actions. The Committee investigated loan transactions between Selectra Electronics Corporation (SELEC) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). SELEC applied for and obtained foreign currency and peso loans from DBP between 1976 and 1977, with respondents Mr. and Mrs. Pedro Garcia, Sr., Santiago Dumlao, Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Don M. Ferry, and Placido Mapa involved in the negotiation and approval processes. The Committee concluded these were behest loans due to SELEC's insufficient capital and collateral, and the project's non-feasibility. Procedural History: On September 15, 1997, the Committee filed a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 3(a) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the involved individuals with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB Case No. 0-97-1740). The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on June 19, 1998, citing prescription, as the transactions occurred between 1976 and 1980, and the complaint was filed on September 15, 1997, more than ten years later. The Ombudsman relied on Section 11 of R.A. 3019 and jurisprudence stating prescription runs from the commission of the offense for public instruments. The Petition: The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to nullify the Ombudsman's dismissal order, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by ruling that the offense had prescribed. The PCGG contended that the prescriptive period should commence from the discovery of the offense, not its commission, citing the nature of behest loans implying concealment and the applicability of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as suppletory to R.A. 3019.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that there was no cause to proceed against any of the respondents and whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offense had already prescribed.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Ombudsman dated June 19, 1998, in OMB Case No. 0-97-1740 is SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is directed to conduct the preliminary investigation of OMB Case No. 0-97-1740 with dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of the offense: The Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of prescription. The applicable rule for computing the prescriptive period for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended. This section provides two rules for the commencement of the prescriptive period: first, on the day of the commission of the violation, if known; and second, if the commission of the violation is not known at the time, then from its discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. Given that behest loans inherently involve concealment, it is often impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to know the exact time of their commission. Therefore, the prescriptive period should commence from the discovery of the offense. The Committee discovered the behest loans on September 8, 1997, and filed the complaint on September 15, 1997, which was well within the prescriptive period. The Court reiterated its ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, et al., which involved a similar complaint for behest loans, confirming that prescription runs from discovery in such cases. The Ombudsman's reliance on the principle that prescription runs from the commission of the offense for public instruments was deemed misplaced in this context due to the clandestine nature of behest loans. Consequently, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was erroneous, constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses under Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) commences from the discovery of the offense, not from the date of its commission, especially when the nature of the offense, such as behest loans, implies concealment.