Salvador v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Hotel Mirador, Inc. obtained three loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) totaling P95,000,000.00 between March 19, 1975, and April 22, 1977, to finance its hotel construction. The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), created by Administrative Order No. 13, investigated these loans based on criteria set by Memorandum Order No. 61, including under-collateralization, undercapitalization, endorsement by high officials, crony involvement, deviation from loan purpose, corporate layering, project non-feasibility, and extraordinary speed in loan release. The Committee, through petitioner Atty. Orlando Salvador, concluded these were behest loans. Procedural History: A sworn complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on September 18, 1996, against directors/officers of Hotel Mirador and DBP officials for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint alleged that the loans were under-collateralized and Hotel Mirador was undercapitalized. The Ombudsman, in a Resolution dated April 27, 1998, dismissed the complaint, finding no sufficient evidence of behest loans and that the crime had prescribed, citing the 15-year prescriptive period under R.A. 3019 and Act No. 3326, with the latest transaction on April 22, 1977. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order, arguing that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the complaint was barred by prescription and that Hotel Mirador had sufficient assets. Petitioner contended that the right of the Republic to recover behest loans is imprescriptible, or alternatively, that the offense was discovered only in 1992 when the Committee was created, making the complaint seasonably filed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. Whether the crime of violation of R.A. 3019 has prescribed. Whether the loans obtained by Hotel Mirador from DBP were behest loans.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Resolution dated April 27, 1998, and the Order dated June 29, 1998, of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2539 are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Ombudsman's discretion and grave abuse thereof: The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman has wide latitude and discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed or not, and this discretion is virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention. The Court consistently refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's exercise of these powers unless there are good and compelling reasons, such as grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the Court found no cogent reason to deviate from this rule. The Ombudsman's Resolution was based on substantial evidence, and the Court found no showing that the DBP Board of Directors failed to exercise sound business judgment or that the approval of the loans was contrary to banking practices. The complainant failed to point out circumstances indicating criminal design or collusion between DBP officers and Hotel Mirador to cause undue injury to the government. On the issue of prescription: The Court reiterated its ruling in previous cases that for violations of R.A. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the prescriptive period is computed from the discovery of the offense, not from the date of commission, especially when the government, as the aggrieved party, could not have known of the violations due to connivance. Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, clearly states that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. In this case, the offense was discovered in 1992 when the Committee was created, and the complaint was filed on September 18, 1996, well within the 15-year prescriptive period. The Court found the Ombudsman's interpretation that 'not known' means 'not reasonably knowable' unacceptable as it defeats the clear intent of the law. The prescriptive period was interrupted when proceedings were instituted against the guilty person. On the issue of whether the loans were behest loans: While the Court did not directly rule on this due to the dismissal on prescription and lack of grave abuse of discretion, it noted that the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint based on findings that Hotel Mirador had sufficient collateral and assets, and the DBP's approval of the loans was based on sound business judgment. The petitioner failed to present evidence demonstrating that the DBP officials acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, or that the transactions were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as required by Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. 3019, when the commission of the violation is not known at the time, is computed from the discovery thereof, and not from the day of commission. The Ombudsman's discretion to dismiss a complaint is virtually free from judicial intervention unless grave abuse of discretion is shown.