Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information for falsification of public documents (Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037) was filed against petitioner Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac and others. Petitioner moved to quash the information on grounds of lack of authority of the filing officer and duplicity of offenses. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion to quash based on the second ground. Subsequently, two new informations (Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988 and Q-93-49989) for falsification of public documents, arising from the same questioned acts, were filed against the same accused. Procedural History: Petitioner moved to quash the new informations on the ground of double jeopardy. The RTC denied the motion to quash Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988, holding that it involved a different document than the previously quashed information and thus did not constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's denial, stating that since the prior information was quashed on petitioner's motion due to duplicity, he was not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a new, proper information. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's decision and arguing that the prosecution under the new information would constitute double jeopardy and violate his right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution of petitioner under the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 constitutes double jeopardy, considering that the previous information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was quashed upon his motion after arraignment. Whether petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases has been violated due to the delay in the filing of the subsequent informations.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court ordered the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 227) to proceed with the petitioner's arraignment in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court held that not all elements for double jeopardy were present. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, with a valid plea, and the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. While the first three elements were present in the prior case, the termination was upon the petitioner's motion to quash. Citing Sta. Rita vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that when the dismissal of a criminal case is effected at the instance of the accused, he is deemed to have expressly consented to such dismissal, thus negating the element of lack of consent required for double jeopardy. Therefore, the subsequent filing of a proper information for the same offense is not barred. On the issue of speedy disposition of cases: The Court ruled in the negative. It distinguished the present case from Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan and Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where delays were found to be politically motivated or unreasonably deprived the accused of benefits. In this case, no proof of persecution or vexatious delays was presented. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy disposition is violated only when proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements, or when without cause, a long period elapses without the case being tried. A mere mathematical reckoning of time is insufficient. The Court noted that petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition, only raising the issue of double jeopardy. The OSG brought up the speedy disposition issue, and even then, petitioner did not actively pursue it. The two-year delay in refiling the informations was not shown to be vexatious, capricious, or oppressive, and the petitioner's failure to assert his right was deemed a waiver, similar to the ruling in Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan.
Main Doctrine
The dismissal of an information upon motion of the accused, even if based on grounds that would ordinarily bar double jeopardy, does not constitute double jeopardy if the accused expressly consented to the dismissal. Furthermore, the right to speedy disposition of cases is violated only when proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, and not merely by a mathematical reckoning of time.