Rubenito v. Lagata
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Ana Rubenito and Baby Macaya were registered owners of a parcel of land. In June 1991, private respondents Lolita Lagata and Rolando Bincang, claiming to be the registered owners, filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners before the Punong Barangay of Nangka, Marikina City. A compromise agreement, denominated "KASUNDUANG PAG-AAYOS," was executed by the parties, wherein petitioners were given six months to vacate the premises by December 11, 1991. Procedural History: Petitioners failed to vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) for the execution of the barangay compromise agreement. The MeTC dismissed the complaint, treating it as an ejectment case, for lack of prior demand to vacate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC's decision, treating the "KASUNDUANG PAG-AAYOS" as a mere contract. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower courts, holding that the complaint was for the enforcement of an amicable settlement with the force of a final judgment and directed the MeTC to order its execution. A Writ of Execution, Notice to Vacate, and Order of Demolition were subsequently issued by the MeTC. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the Writ of Execution, Notice to Vacate, and Order of Demolition, alleging that they did not receive a copy of the CA decision, thus it was not yet final and executory, and that the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review on certiorari assailing orders of the MeTC, when the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and whether the petitioners observed the hierarchy of courts. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its decision, considering the alleged non-receipt of the CA decision. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari, considering the finality of the CA decision and the propriety of the Writ of Execution and Order of Demolition.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. Double costs against petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy and observance of the hierarchy of courts: The Court clarified that the petition, which assails the jurisdiction of the MeTC to issue the Writ of Execution, Notice to Vacate, and Order of Demolition due to the alleged non-finality of the CA decision, falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court emphasized that while the Supreme Court, RTCs, and CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, direct resort to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should only be allowed when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This policy is necessary to prevent undue demands on the Court's time and to avoid overcrowding its docket. In this case, petitioners failed to offer any exceptional or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts, and thus, the petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. The Court reiterated the principle that litigation must end, and it cannot condone any abuse of the judicial process or dilatory maneuvers meant to evade manifest obligations. On the alleged non-receipt of the CA decision: The Court found the petitioners' contention that they or their counsel did not receive the CA decision to be misleading. The records showed that the CA decision, dated April 16, 1998, was sent by registered mail to petitioners' original counsel and was received on April 24, 1998, by a person in his office. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands, and petitioners failed to present evidence to overcome this presumption. Consequently, the CA decision became final and executory on May 9, 1998, as the period to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal would have expired on May 11, 1998. The Court characterized the petitioners' claim as a clear-cut afterthought meant to delay the settlement of the legal dispute and evade their obligations. On the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Demolition: Given that the CA decision had become final and executory, it was the MeTC's ministerial duty to order the execution of the amicable settlement. The petitioners' claim that they did not receive the Order of Demolition was also viewed as part of their dilatory tactics. The Court stressed that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of their victory by mere subterfuge. The undue delay in the execution of the final judgment constituted an injustice to the private respondents, and the Court expressed its disfavor for such unjustified delays in enforcing final orders and decisions.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail acts of a court performed without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Direct resort to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition, to prevent undue demands on the Court's time and to avoid overcrowding its docket.