Cerezo v. Tuazon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On June 26, 1993, a bus owned by petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo (Mrs. Cerezo) collided with a tricycle driven by respondent David Tuazon, causing severe injuries to Tuazon and damage to his tricycle. Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, her husband Atty. Juan Cerezo, and the bus driver, Danilo Foronda. Procedural History: Summons on the Cerezo spouses were initially returned unserved but were later served at Atty. Cerezo's office. The Cerezo spouses, through counsel, participated in the proceedings, filing various motions. They were eventually declared in default for failure to file an answer. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Mrs. Cerezo to pay Tuazon actual damages, loss of earnings, moral damages, and costs. Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for relief from judgment, which was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied. Subsequently, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment, which the Court of Appeals also dismissed, holding that the remedy of annulment was no longer available after availing of a petition for relief. This dismissal was affirmed upon reconsideration. The Petition: Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' dismissal of her petition for annulment of judgment. She argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of summons on Foronda, an alleged indispensable party, and that the Court of Appeals disregarded this lack of jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the lack of service of summons on the bus driver, Danilo Foronda, and whether Foronda was an indispensable party to the action for damages based on quasi-delict. Whether the Cerezo spouses waived any defect in the service of summons or jurisdiction by their voluntary appearance and participation in the proceedings. Whether the remedies of petition for relief from judgment and petition for annulment of judgment were properly availed of; and the nature of employer's liability under Article 2180. Whether the employer's liability under Article 2180 is primary and direct, and the effect of voluntary appearance.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment is affirmed. The trial court's decision ordering Mrs. Cerezo to pay damages is upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of remedies and waiver of objections: The Court reiterated that a party declared in default has several remedies, including a motion to set aside the order of default, a motion for new trial, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. A petition for relief from judgment is available only in exceptional cases when other remedies are lost due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Mrs. Cerezo's repeated filing of different remedies after the denial of previous ones, particularly filing a petition for relief after the judgment became final and executory, and then filing a petition for annulment after the petition for relief was denied, showed a pattern of attempting to evade liability. The Court found that Mrs. Cerezo had other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available, such as appeal or certiorari, but she erroneously chose a petition for relief. Furthermore, her active participation in the proceedings before the trial court, including filing pleadings and attending hearings, constituted a waiver of any alleged defect in the service of summons or acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. The Court emphasized that the extraordinary remedy of annulment of judgment is restricted to specific grounds and cannot be used to revive lost remedies or make a farce of a final judgment. On the jurisdiction over the person and the necessity of Foronda as an indispensable party: The Court clarified that the action filed by Tuazon was based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, not on delict under the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 2180, the employer's liability is primary and direct, not merely subsidiary. This means the employer can be sued directly for the negligent acts of their employees, even without impleading the employee or acquiring jurisdiction over them. Therefore, Foronda was not an indispensable party, and the trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo was sufficient to render a valid judgment against her. The Court distinguished this from liability arising from a delict, where the employer's liability is subsidiary and requires a prior determination of the employee's guilt and primary liability. On the waiver of jurisdiction and the effect of voluntary appearance: The Court reiterated the principle that any defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over a party's person can be waived by voluntary appearance and participation in the proceedings. The Cerezo spouses' active engagement in the trial court, filing motions and appearing through counsel, demonstrated their submission to the court's jurisdiction. This voluntary appearance cured any potential infirmity in the initial service of summons. The Court noted that raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, after actively participating in the proceedings, is barred by estoppel or laches, as established in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. On the availability of remedies and the nature of employer's liability under Article 2180: The Court explained that Article 2180 establishes a primary and direct liability for the employer, stemming from the employer's own negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. This liability is distinct from the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which arises from the employee's criminal offense. The Court cited Barredo v. Garcia to emphasize that the direct action against the employer is more expeditious and avoids the cumbersome procedure of first exhausting the employee's assets, especially when the employee may not have sufficient means. The employer's responsibility is not merely accessory but a principal action in itself, even though it presupposes the employee's act. On the nature of employer's liability under Article 2180 and the effect of voluntary appearance: The Court explained that Article 2180 establishes a primary and direct liability for the employer, stemming from the employer's own negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The Court reiterated the principle that any defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over a party's person can be waived by voluntary appearance and participation in the proceedings.
Main Doctrine
An employer's liability for damages caused by an employee's negligence under Article 2180 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) is primary and direct, not subsidiary. Therefore, the employee is not an indispensable party, and the employer can be sued directly, even without acquiring jurisdiction over the employee.