University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The University of Immaculate Concepcion (UIC) and its directress, Sister Maria Jacinta De Belen, were subjected to labor inspections by Engineer Yolibelle S. Avinante of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). These inspections, initiated under Article 128 of the Labor Code, sought various employment and payroll records, including proof of 13th-month pay and compliance with occupational safety and health standards. UIC initially resisted the inspections and subsequently opposed the findings of violations. 2. Procedural History: Following the inspections, the Regional Director of DOLE Regional Office No. XI found UIC liable for violations of labor and safety laws, ordering the payment of P2,339,752.74 to 193 employees. After a denied motion for reconsideration, the DOLE Secretary, through former Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, modified the order, directing payment of P38,967.50 to 15 employees for underpayment of cost of living allowances. UIC's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied, with the second being noted without action as a prohibited pleading. A petition for certiorari was then filed with the Supreme Court, which was referred to the Court of Appeals. 3. The Petition: The University of Immaculate Concepcion filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals' Resolutions. Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited and in dismissing their petition for certiorari as untimely. They contended that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the rules regarding the interruption of prescriptive periods for filing a certiorari petition, particularly concerning the effect of filing a second motion for reconsideration.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited; specifically, whether the second motion was pro forma and thus did not toll the prescriptive period. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being filed out of time, considering the delays and the extraordinary nature of certiorari.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed in toto.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the prohibition of a second motion for reconsideration: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of timeliness. The Court reiterated that under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to interrupt the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. Even if a second motion for reconsideration were not strictly prohibited under DOLE rules, the one filed by the petitioners was considered pro forma as it merely reiterated arguments already passed upon in the first motion for reconsideration. A pro forma motion does not toll the prescriptive period. The Court cited Vda. de Espina vs. Abaya to support the principle that a pro forma second motion for reconsideration does not suspend the period to file a petition for certiorari. On the timeliness of the petition for certiorari: The Court found that the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari significantly out of time. They received the DOLE Secretary's Order denying their first motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1998. Their second motion for reconsideration was filed on May 20, 1998, which was noted without action on March 30, 1999. A copy of this resolution was received on April 20, 1999. The petition for certiorari was only filed on May 13, 1999. This clearly shows a delay of almost one year from the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. The Court emphasized that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and requires strict observance of procedural rules, citing Manila Midtown Hotels & Land Corp. vs. NLRC. Since the assailed Orders of the DOLE Secretary had become final and executory due to the procedural misstep, the merits of the case could no longer be reviewed for grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration, if pro forma or a mere reiteration of arguments already passed upon, does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari. Strict adherence to procedural rules, especially concerning the timeliness of appeals and extraordinary remedies, is imperative.