Padilla v. Aure
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The controversy involves Lot 9098, Cad. 455-D, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 34,932 square meters, originally recognized as occupied by Dr. Conrado Potenciano. After his death in 1954, the property remained under his name for tax purposes. In 1982, pending settlement of Dr. Potenciano's estate, the judicial administrator sold the property to spouses Chito and Nenita Coson, who subsequently sold it to Catherine Tuazon, who in turn sold it to E.S. Aure Lending Investor, Inc. (ESALI), represented by Ernesto S. Aure. All deeds of sale stipulated that the final deed of sale would be executed after survey, segregation, and court approval. Procedural History: On September 10, 1996, respondent Aure filed a free patent application for the property with the DENR, claiming ownership based on a deed of sale from ESALI. Petitioners, heirs of Lourdes Potenciano Padilla and legal heirs of Dr. Conrado Potenciano, protested the application, asserting that the property was adjudicated to them via an extra-judicial partition approved in 1986 and that they had applied for original titling in 1997. The DENR Regional Executive Director dismissed the protest and directed the processing of Aure's free patent application. This dismissal was affirmed by the DENR Secretary and denied reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President, which reversed the DENR rulings and gave due course to Aure's protest. Aure moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 43, Aure filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals reversed the Office of the President's decision, reinstating the DENR's ruling. Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. The Petition: Petitioners assail the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution, arguing that the appellate court erred in giving due course to respondent Aure's petition for certiorari, as it was used as a substitute for a lost appeal, and in treating the certiorari petition as an ordinary appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari filed by respondent as a substitute for a lost appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating the petition for certiorari as an ordinary appeal under Rule 43.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious. The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to and in granting respondent Aure's petition for certiorari. The filing of the certiorari suit did not prevent the Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President from becoming final.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the certiorari petition: The Court held that the availability of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to appeal the Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President effectively foreclosed respondent Aure's right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last resort, lying only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. The Court emphasized that a petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, and the two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and not alternative or successive. In this case, respondent Aure received the Resolution of the Office of the President denying his motion for reconsideration on August 4, 2000. The 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 43 lapsed on August 19, 2000. Respondent filed his petition for certiorari on September 8, 2000, more than a month after the period to appeal had lapsed, without offering any reason for the delay or failure to comply with the rules. There was no showing that petitioners misled, prevented, or obstructed respondent from pursuing an appeal, and respondent had ample time and opportunity to file an appeal under Rule 43. Therefore, the special civil action for certiorari was an obvious move to make up for the loss of the right of ordinary appeal. On the Court of Appeals' treatment of the petition: The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in blurring the distinction between a special civil action for certiorari and a petition for review. The appellate court wrongly identified the case as an "appeal by petition for review" and stated that "The Court finds merit in the appeal." The Court's decision focused on the merits of the case as if it were an ordinary appeal, rather than discussing jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion. The Court noted that the only mention of grave abuse of discretion was a sweeping conclusion that the Office of the President "gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decisions of the agencies and tribunals preceding its own, meriting correction by this Court." This conclusion did not meet the standards set by jurisprudence for grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President, instead of nullifying it, which would have been proper in a certiorari case. The Court stressed that procedural law has a rationale in the orderly administration of justice and that the enforcement of procedural rules is not antithetical to substantive rights.
Main Doctrine
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 43. The availability of the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 forecloses the right to resort to certiorari, as certiorari is a remedy of last resort and lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.