Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Dionisio B. Azucena was hired as Chief Engineer on a Norwegian vessel owned by K.S. Kasmito, through its agent Foreign Manpower Services (FMS). His employment contract was for ten months, commencing May 7, 1992. However, his contract was terminated on August 3, 1992. Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of his family's allotment with the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) against FMS, Kasmito, and the vessel's insurer, Fortune Life & General Insurance Co., Inc. Procedural History: The POEA ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering the respondents to refund the balance of his family's allotment. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which modified the POEA decision, ordering respondents to pay petitioner his cash allotment equivalent to two months' salary plus attorney's fees. After the NLRC decision became final and executory, petitioner filed a separate complaint for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, alleging that he was blacklisted by shipping agencies due to the case filed with the POEA, ruining his career. This complaint was initially dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on grounds of prescription and lack of jurisdiction, but the NLRC reversed this dismissal and remanded the case. A subsequent decision by a Labor Arbiter awarded petitioner damages, but the NLRC reversed this again and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was referred to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Petition: The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari. Petitioner's counsel received the CA decision on November 27, 2000, giving petitioner until December 12, 2000, to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, petitioner's counsel filed a petition for relief from judgment with the CA on January 18, 2001, alleging relocation of his office prevented timely knowledge of the decision. The CA denied this petition. Petitioner, through new counsel, then filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the CA's dismissal of his certiorari petition and its denial of his petition for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court noted that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy, as the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is only subject to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Furthermore, the Court found that the negligence of petitioner's former counsel in failing to file the appeal on time was not excusable, and thus, the petition was dismissed.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying a petition for relief from judgment. Whether the negligence of counsel in failing to file an appeal within the reglementary period constitutes inexcusable negligence warranting relief from judgment.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy: The present petition is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner had until December 12, 2000, to file either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' November 17, 2000 Decision. Instead, he filed a petition for relief from judgment on January 18, 2001. The period for filing a petition for review on certiorari had lapsed. Furthermore, an order denying a petition for relief from judgment is not appealable under Rule 41 and is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari to assail the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court cannot treat the present petition as a special action for certiorari under Rule 65 because it assigns reversible errors in the November 17, 2000 Decision rather than alleging grave abuse of discretion. On the negligence of counsel: A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional cases where no other adequate remedy is available. It cannot be used to revive the right to appeal lost through inexcusable negligence. In this case, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented petitioner from filing a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari. The failure of petitioner's former counsel to notify him of the adverse decision, even if it resulted in the loss of the right to appeal, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Jurisprudence holds that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect of counsel to inform his client does not justify setting aside a valid judgment. The relocation of the counsel's office without proper notice to the court does not constitute excusable negligence. While there are exceptions to the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client, such as when it deprives the client of due process, these exceptions are not applicable here. Petitioner was afforded due process as he had his day in court and every opportunity to be heard. To grant relief would put a premium on negligence and encourage endless litigation.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the incorrect remedy to assail an order denying a petition for relief from judgment, which is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The negligence of counsel, even if inexcusable, generally binds the client, and does not warrant setting aside a judgment that has become final and executory, absent exceptions like deprivation of due process.