Petilla v. Ardiente
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Jeriel L. Ardiente, a Nurse I at the Hilongos District Hospital, filed a letter-protest with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on July 1, 1999, assailing his transfers to the Provincial Health Office and then to the Northwestern Leyte District Hospital. During the period of June 1 to August 31, 1999, Ardiente applied for sick and vacation leave. His leave applications were disapproved by the Provincial Health Office on September 7, 1999, based on CSC rules. Ardiente subsequently failed to report to his new workstation until October 4, 1999. Consequently, on October 4, 1999, petitioner Governor Remedios L. Petilla issued Memorandum No. 99-255, dropping Ardiente from the roll of employees for unauthorized absences, citing Section 35, Rule XVI of the CSC Rules. Ardiente did not appeal this memorandum. Procedural History: On February 14, 2000, the CSC issued Resolution No. 00-0441, declaring Ardiente's reassignments void and directing his restoration to his former workstation. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC on April 2, 2001. Subsequently, petitioner sought to appeal these CSC resolutions to the Court of Appeals (CA) by filing a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. Crucially, petitioner's employees, Ruth A. Loreto and Celia Maria dela Cruz, received the CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on April 24, 2001, but did not furnish petitioner with a copy until May 29, 2001. Petitioner filed her motion for extension and petition for review on May 31, 2001. The CA, in its Resolution dated June 22, 2001, denied due course and dismissed the petition for review for failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 29, 2001, for being filed out of time. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated June 22, 2001, and October 29, 2001. The petition argues that the CA erred in dismissing her petition for review. The CA's initial dismissal was based on the failure to attach clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of essential documents, violating Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration was based on the finding that it was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Petitioner contends that her employees' delayed delivery of the CSC resolution excused the late filing. The Supreme Court, however, found that the receipt of the resolution by petitioner's authorized employees on April 24, 2001, constituted notice to the petitioner, rendering the subsequent filing on May 31, 2001, untimely and thus warranting dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying due course and dismissing the petition for review for failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. Whether respondent's dismissal from the roll of employees rendered the CSC resolutions moot and academic.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for review, but the ground should have been that the petition was filed out of time. Petitioner admitted that the petition for review was filed after the lapse of the 15-day period to appeal. Her justification that she only received CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on May 29, 2001, because her employees, Ruth and Celia, received it on April 24, 2001, and she was attending to election matters, was found to be flimsy and unrealistic. The receipt of the resolution by Ruth and Celia, who were authorized representatives, is considered receipt by the petitioner. Therefore, the period to appeal should be computed from April 24, 2001. On the denial of the motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time: The Court of Appeals correctly found that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. The CA's records showed that a copy of the June 22, 2001 Resolution was received on the same date by Jaime Santos at petitioner's address. This meant the 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration expired on July 14, 2001. The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 20, 2001, more than two months late. The Court reiterated that perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the judgment final and executory. On whether respondent's dismissal rendered the CSC resolutions moot and academic: The Court found both parties at fault for raising issues for the first time before the Supreme Court. However, the Court believed respondent deserved a chance to defend his side. The Court noted that petitioner issued the memorandum dismissing respondent while his protest was pending with the CSC. The Court found that respondent's absence from June 1 to August 31, 1999, was based on approved leave applications, and he was only notified of their disapproval on September 9, 1999. Thus, he could not be considered AWOL for that period. For the period from September 1 to October 4, 1999, the Court considered him on leave without pay, not AWOL, especially since the CSC later declared the reassignment order void. The Court stated that while notice is generally required for dismissal due to AWOL, amendments to CSC rules allow dismissal without prior notice, but the employee must be informed of the separation within five days of its effectivity. The Court ultimately found that petitioner failed to show respondent openly defied reassignment orders or intended to go AWOL.
Main Doctrine
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period renders the judgment final and executory, depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the judgment, with the appellate court having the power only to dismiss the appeal. Receipt of a resolution by an authorized representative of a party is considered receipt by the party himself for the purpose of computing the period to appeal.