Igot v. Manila Electric Company
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Atty. Romeo B. Igot and respondent Manila Electric Company (Meralco) executed a service contract for electricity. Petitioner discovered an unusually low electric bill and found that his meter had stopped rotating. After Meralco failed to respond to his request for inspection, he received a significantly higher estimated bill and a demand for payment of P111,182.05 due to alleged defects in the metering installation, citing Republic Act No. 7832. Petitioner received a notice of disconnection. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. The RTC issued a TRO, and Meralco agreed not to disconnect service pending resolution. However, Meralco disconnected the service on July 9, 1999. Petitioner paid a bill to secure reconnection, which was eventually restored on July 13, 1999, after further demands and partial payment. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction on July 15, 1999. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint impleading Meralco's lawyers and an employee for alleged refusal to reconnect. The RTC dismissed the complaint on January 11, 2001, due to petitioner's failure to appear, and denied his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion. On August 24, 2001, Meralco disconnected the electric supply again, hours before the CA issued a resolution enjoining further proceedings and ordering Meralco to cease disconnecting service. The CA later issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering reconnection within 24 hours from notice of bond approval. Petitioner posted a surety bond, but Meralco argued it was ineffective as it was a surety bond and not a cash deposit as allegedly required by RA 7832. The CA decision directed the RTC to proceed with the trial and made the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction permanent. Meralco filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Meralco filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (SC) (G.R. No. 149913), which was denied on December 5, 2001. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the SC to compel the CA to execute its writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, or alternatively, to direct the Pasig Police Station to implement the CA's writs and to cite Meralco's officers and lawyers in contempt. Meralco commented that it had reconnected the electric supply on February 14, 2001, rendering the mandamus petition moot and academic, and denied that the CA issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction or was notified of the bond approval.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for mandamus has become moot and academic due to the restoration of electric supply by Meralco. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the omnibus motion filed with the CA to cite Meralco's officers and lawyers in contempt of the CA.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for mandamus for being moot and academic and denied the petitioner's omnibus motion to cite Meralco's officers and lawyers for contempt.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of mootness: The Court agreed that the petition for mandamus had become moot and academic because the electric supply to the petitioner's house had been restored by Meralco during the pendency of the case. The Court noted that, contrary to the petitioner's allegations, the Court of Appeals (CA) had not issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prior to its decision. The CA's Resolution dated August 31, 2001, ordered reconnection within twenty-four hours "from notice of the approval of the petitioner’s bond," but the CA never actually approved the surety bond posted by the petitioner on September 3, 2001. Therefore, the condition for the writ's effectivity was not met, and the subsequent restoration of service rendered the mandamus petition moot. On the issue of contempt: The Court denied the petitioner's plea to cite Meralco's officers and lawyers for indirect contempt. The Court emphasized that contempt proceedings are initiated before the court against which the contempt was committed. Citing Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the Court explained that the charge for indirect contempt must be filed with the court contemned. The rationale is that only the court that issued the order has the authority to determine whether it has been complied with and whether contempt has been committed. The Supreme Court, in this instance, could not punish contempt against the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, being a lawyer, should have known this procedural rule. The Court reiterated the principle that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another, as this would undermine the authority and dignity of the contemned court.
Main Doctrine
A petition for mandamus becomes moot and academic when the subject matter of the petition has already been rendered moot by supervening events. Furthermore, charges for indirect contempt must be filed before the court against which the contempt was committed, as only the court contemned has the jurisdiction to determine and punish contempt.