Marzalado v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute arose from an ejectment case filed by Luz Marzalado against Cristina N. Albano, a lessee of a unit owned by Luz. Following a judgment ordering Albano to vacate, and during her appeal, the electricity to the unit was disconnected. Albano then moved her children elsewhere, leaving only a maid. Albano later discovered her lead pipe missing and subsequently found the padlock on her unit's main door changed, preventing entry. Upon further inspection, she found the unit empty, with roofing removed and the main door locked from the inside. She reported the matter and filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling, and theft against Salvador Marzalado, Jr., the son of the property owner. Procedural History: The complaint for trespass to dwelling was filed against Salvador Marzalado, Jr. in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. After arraignment and a plea of not guilty, summary hearings were conducted. The MeTC convicted Marzalado, Jr. of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, sentencing him to two months and one day of arresto mayor and a fine. Marzalado, Jr. appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MeTC's decision in its entirety. Undeterred, Marzalado, Jr. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which also affirmed the RTC's decision and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the conviction for qualified trespass to dwelling. The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in upholding the lower courts' findings, asserting that his entry into the premises was justified under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (justifying circumstances) to prevent imminent danger to property, specifically a flooding unit caused by an open faucet. He contends his entry was made with the assistance of barangay officials and for a valid purpose. Furthermore, he claims the Information was fatally defective due to a discrepancy in the date of the alleged offense, stating November 2, 1993, instead of November 3, 1993, as he asserts was the actual date of his entry.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of Marzalado, Jr. for qualified trespass to dwelling, and whether the petitioner's entry into the leased premises was justified under the circumstances. Whether the discrepancy in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information renders it fatally defective.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and acquitted petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr. of the charge of qualified trespass to dwelling for lack of evidence to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the conviction and justification for entry: The Court found that the petitioner's entry into the leased unit was legally justified. Evidence, including a certification from the Barangay Lupon Secretary and Albano's own admission that she had left the unit vacant, indicated that the unit was being flooded due to an open faucet. The petitioner acted to prevent further flooding and damage to his mother's property. The Court reasoned that no criminal intent could be imputed to the petitioner for taking remedial action in an exigency to avoid damage. The Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the accused, finding palpable doubt as to his guilt. The Court concluded that the evidence on record was insufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of the offense charged. While the prosecution presented an eyewitness, Narciso Raniedo, who testified to seeing the petitioner enter the unit and remove Albano's belongings on November 2, 1993, Albano herself discovered the trespass on November 3, 1993. The Court found that the petitioner's defense, relating to his entry on November 3, 1993, to turn off the faucet, was more credible given the circumstances. The Court reiterated that criminal cases rise or fall on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, and in this case, the evidence failed to convince the Court of the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that in situations of ambiguity where an act permits of two possible significations, one culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. Given the justified purpose of the petitioner's entry to prevent damage to property, the Court found that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, leading to his acquittal. The Court reiterated that the elements of trespass to dwelling are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter's will. The gravamen of the crime is the violation of possession or the injury to the right of possession. The prosecution must establish criminal intent and guilt beyond reasonable doubt, relying on the strength of its own evidence. On the issue of the Information's defect: The Court held that the discrepancy in the date of the alleged trespass (November 2, 1993, in the Information versus November 3, 1993, as claimed by the petitioner) does not render the Information fatally defective. Citing Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, the Court explained that the precise date of the offense need not be stated unless it is a material ingredient of the offense. It is sufficient that the date alleged is as near as possible to the actual date of commission. The Court emphasized that a variance between the time stated in the indictment and that established by evidence does not constitute an error serious enough to warrant reversal solely on that ground, especially when the date is not a decisive issue in the case.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner of qualified trespass to dwelling, holding that his entry into the leased premises to prevent further flooding caused by an open faucet was justified under the circumstances, thereby negating criminal intent and establishing reasonable doubt as to his guilt.