People v. Saballegue
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Serafin Saballegue, proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, was charged with violating Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, the Social Security Act. The information alleged that from February 1990 up to the present, Saballegue willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refused and failed to remit SSS premiums for his employees, amounting to P6,533.00, plus a penalty of P11,143.28 as of March 15, 2000, despite demands. Procedural History: The information was filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty on September 24, 2001. Three days later, he filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor, as required by Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The People opposed this motion. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, granted the motion to dismiss on February 26, 2002, finding the information defective for lack of jurisdiction. The People filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 3, 2002, for failing to comply with the notice requirements. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the RTC's dismissal orders. They argued that State Prosecutor Tolentino, as a special prosecutor designated to handle SSS cases, had the authority to file the information without prior approval from the city prosecutor. The petitioner contended that the RTC gravely abused its discretion by dismissing the information, ignoring the inhibition of the city prosecutor, and interfering with executive functions. The petition also addressed procedural issues, including the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration and the applicability of Rule 65 versus Rule 45. The core legal issue was whether the lack of prior written approval from the city or provincial prosecutor rendered the information void and whether this defect could be waived by the accused's plea.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by the People tolled the reglementary period for filing the petition. Whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary for the filing of the information. Whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The orders of the RTC dated February 26, 2002, and April 3, 2002, are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized officer.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition: The Court ruled that the petition was filed within the reglementary period. The motion for reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 2002, considering that March 14, 2002, was the receipt date of the first order, and the 15th day thereafter was Good Friday, making the next working day the deadline. The denial of the motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2002, and the subsequent receipt of this order on April 11, 2002, meant that the petition for certiorari and mandamus, filed within sixty (60) days from April 11, 2002, was within the prescribed period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The argument that a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not toll the period was deemed inapplicable as this was an original petition under Rule 65, not an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. On whether the motion for reconsideration tolled the period: The Court ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the People tolled the reglementary period for filing the petition for certiorari and mandamus. The motion was timely filed, and therefore, the period to file the petition was properly tolled until the denial of the motion for reconsideration. On the necessity of prior written authority: The Court held that the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary for the filing of the information. Presidential Decree No. 1275 vests Regional State Prosecutors with administrative supervision, not the power of control or the authority to appoint special prosecutors who can file informations without the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor. The directive of the Regional State Prosecutor to inhibit city/provincial prosecutors was deemed questionable, and the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice or prior written approval from the city/provincial prosecutor meant that State Prosecutor Tolentino was not a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law. The Court clarified that the word "may" in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, in context, is mandatory. On waiver of jurisdictional defects: The Court affirmed that the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial, or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived by the accused's plea or cured by silence, acquiescence, or express consent. Citing Villa v. Ibañez, Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, and Cudia v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated that an infirmity in the information, such as the lack of authority of the officer signing it, prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. This defect is not a mere formal objection that is waived by arraignment but a fundamental flaw that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The Court noted that despite modifications in the Rules of Criminal Procedure over the years, the doctrine established in Villa regarding jurisdictional defects remains controlling.
Main Doctrine
The filing of an information by an officer without the requisite prior written authority or approval from the proper prosecutor constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived by the accused's plea or cured by silence, acquiescence, or express consent, and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.