Dwikarna v. Domingo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Agus Dwikarna and two other Indonesian nationals were apprehended at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) for possession of two pieces of oval-shaped C-4 plastic explosives and five pieces of detonating cords. An information was filed against them for violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition). Subsequently, a charge sheet was filed by the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and later amended to include a charge for violation of Section 37(a)(8) of the same Act, alleging they were undesirable aliens due to involvement in Islamic extremist movements and advocating for the overthrow of organized government. Procedural History: Petitioner and his co-accused were allowed to post bail for their provisional liberty in the criminal case, but their release was prevented by the detention order from the BI. They filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging illegal arrest and restraint. While the habeas corpus petition was pending, the charges against Dwikarna's co-accused were withdrawn, leading to their release. The CA dismissed Dwikarna's habeas corpus petition, holding that once a person is duly charged before a court or a quasi-judicial body, habeas corpus is no longer the proper remedy. Meanwhile, the BI Board of Commissioners had not yet rendered a decision on the deportation case. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted petitioner of illegal possession of explosive materials under PD 1866, sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial were denied, and his conviction became final and executory. He failed to appeal the denial of his motion to reconsider the entry of judgment, and his appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for being the wrong mode of appeal. The RTC then ordered his incarceration. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking his release from detention and an injunction against the BI proceedings. He argued that his continued detention was illegal.
Issue(s)
Whether the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are available to petitioner. Whether petitioner is entitled to release from detention. Whether the petition for habeas corpus was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the pending deportation proceedings before the Bureau of Immigration, including the consideration of the lost remedy of appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and the prayer for a temporary mandatory injunction for the release of the petitioner. The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to the extraordinary remedies sought due to the availability of other adequate remedies and the fact that his conviction had become final and executory. The Court also affirmed that habeas corpus is not available once a person is charged in court or before a quasi-judicial body. The Court further stated that it would not interfere with the pending deportation proceedings before the Bureau of Immigration.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus: The Court reiterated its established jurisprudence that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. Similarly, mandamus is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. The Court found that the petitioner had other adequate remedies, including appealing his conviction and awaiting the decision of the Bureau of Immigration on the deportation case. On the availability of habeas corpus: The Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the Court of Appeals. It cited jurisprudence holding that once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The Court emphasized that the term 'court' includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration, thus, habeas corpus is not proper once charged before such bodies. On the petitioner's continued detention and deportation proceedings: The Court found no irregularity or illegality with the petitioner's continued detention. He had been duly charged, convicted by final judgment for illegal possession of explosive materials, and sentenced to imprisonment. The Court also noted that even if he were eventually ordered deported by the Bureau of Immigration, his continued incarceration would still be legally justified. The Court cited Section 37(a)(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which mandates that an alien convicted and sentenced to both imprisonment and deportation shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported, unless the imprisonment is waived. On the interference with administrative proceedings and the lost remedy of appeal: The Court held that resort to court intervention in deportation cases is proper only after a decision is rendered by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau is the agency entrusted with the regulation of activities falling under its special technical knowledge and training. Courts generally do not interfere in matters addressed to the sound discretion of such agencies, and their findings of fact are usually accorded respect. If dissatisfied, the petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies, including moving for reconsideration and then filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court pointed out that the petitioner pursued the wrong mode of appeal by filing directly with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari with mandamus instead of appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. The Court stressed that certiorari is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, which is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner provided by law. Petitioner's conviction had attained finality when the period to file an appeal lapsed.
Main Doctrine
The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or another adequate remedy is available. Mandamus is granted only when no other sufficient remedy is available. Furthermore, a writ of mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch. A petition for habeas corpus is no longer available once a detained person is duly charged in court or before a quasi-judicial body.