People v. Fortus

A.M. No. P-04-1808 · 2005-06-27 · J. CORONA, J.: · Primary: Ethics; Secondary: Criminal
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: An administrative complaint was filed by Judge Tomas C. Leynes against Imelda B. Fortus, Clerk III, for her conviction of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22). Procedural History: Fortus admitted her conviction on three charges of B.P. 22 but argued that probation should preclude dismissal, citing the purpose of reformation. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) evaluated the case, noting that B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude and is a grave offense under Civil Service Law, punishable by dismissal upon first commission. The OCA recommended dismissal, stating that probation does not negate the conviction's effect on the right to hold public office. The Petition: The case was referred to the Supreme Court for resolution.

Issue(s)

Whether the grant of probation to Imelda B. Fortus for violation of B.P. 22 exempts her from dismissal from government service. Whether conviction for violation of B.P. 22 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.

Ruling

Imelda B. Fortus is hereby DISMISSED from the service. She may be allowed to reenter government service if she can prove her fitness to serve once again.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether the grant of probation exempts from dismissal: The Court held that the grant of probation does not remove respondent Fortus from the purview of applicable provisions of the Administrative Code and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. The Court reiterated its pronouncement in Dela Torre v. COMELEC that probation only suspends the execution of the sentence and does not obliterate the conviction. A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, which disqualifies a person from holding public office, subsists and remains totally unaffected by the grant of probation. Therefore, respondent's conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, despite being granted probation, remains a ground for dismissal from the service. The reform and rehabilitation of the respondent, while a purpose of probation, cannot warrant her retention in the service when the conviction itself carries disqualifications. On the issue of whether violation of B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude: The Court affirmed that violation of B.P. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude. This is consistent with established jurisprudence, such as People vs. Tuanda, which characterized offenses under B.P. 22 as involving deceit and affecting the moral character of the convicted person, as also held in Villaber vs. Comelec. Such conviction is considered a grave offense under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, punishable by dismissal upon the first commission.

Main Doctrine

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, even if granted probation, is a ground for dismissal from government service under civil service rules.

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