Icao v. Ramas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Atty. Friolo R. Icao, Jr., Chief of the N.B.I. Pagadian Office, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Reinerio B. Ramas. The complaint alleged that the respondent judge colluded with the Prosecutor to frustrate the ends of justice in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 6515-2K2 and 6516-2K2. The N.B.I. had investigated and applied for a search warrant against Rogelio Pangasian, Eliong Sumalpong, and Daisy Catipay (the "Accused"). Complainant alleged that the respondent judge motu proprio deferred the arraignment of the Accused to allow defense counsel time to file motions to quash, drafted the Prosecutor’s "Comment to the Motions to Quash," and made the Prosecutor sign it. The complainant supported this by claiming the prosecutor's comment and the judge's order were drafted using the same typewriter. Procedural History: The administrative complaint was referred to Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. Justice Lagman submitted her report finding the complaint devoid of merit. The Petition: The administrative case reached the Supreme Court for resolution.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge colluded with the Prosecutor to frustrate the ends of justice. Whether the complainant adduced sufficient evidence to establish the charge of collusion.
Ruling
The administrative case against respondent Judge Reinerio B. Ramas is dismissed for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the respondent judge colluded with the Prosecutor to frustrate the ends of justice: The Court found that the complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence to substantiate his charge of collusion against the respondent judge, except for bare allegations. The assertion that no initiative was taken by the defense counsels to defer the arraignment was refuted by the defense counsels themselves in their Joint Affidavit. Moreover, the complainant admitted he was not present during the scheduled arraignment, thus lacking personal knowledge of what transpired. The defense counsels positively affirmed that they moved to defer the arraignment and manifested their desire to file motions to quash, which they subsequently filed. The complainant's claim regarding the typewriter was also unsubstantiated, and he failed to specify any particular act or participation of the respondent judge in the preparation of the prosecutor's comment. Even assuming the order and comment were prepared on the same typewriter, this alone does not establish collusion. On Whether the complainant adduced sufficient evidence to establish the charge of collusion: The Court held that the complainant miserably failed to satisfy the burden of proof, which requires only a preponderance of evidence in administrative cases. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence presented is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The complainant presented no evidence to corroborate his bare assertions. Coupled with the disputable presumptions of innocence and the proper discharge of duty by public officers, the complainant's failure to present any corroborating evidence rendered his claims unsubstantiated. The investigating Justice correctly found the complaint to be devoid of merit.
Main Doctrine
A judge cannot be held administratively liable for collusion with the prosecution to frustrate the ends of justice based on bare allegations and speculation, especially when evidence presented by the complainant fails to establish any agreement or specific act of participation, and is refuted by defense counsels and public officers' presumptions of proper discharge of duty.