Leung Ben v. O'Brien

G.R. No. L-13602 · 1918-04-06 · J. STREET, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Plaintiff Leung Ben filed an application for a writ of certiorari to quash an attachment issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The attachment was sought by P. J. O'Brien in an action to recover P15,000 allegedly lost by O'Brien to Leung Ben in gambling, banking, and percentage games conducted over two to three months prior to the suit. O'Brien alleged that Leung Ben was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. Procedural History: The sheriff, acting under the attachment, seized P15,000 deposited by Leung Ben with the International Banking Corporation. Leung Ben moved to quash the attachment, but his motion was dismissed by the Court of First Instance. Leung Ben then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Leung Ben contended that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is not an action arising upon a contract, express or implied, as required by Section 424 and 412(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure for the issuance of an attachment. He argued that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ, and that he had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the Supreme Court can entertain a petition for certiorari when an attachment is granted without statutory authority. Whether the statutory obligation to restore money lost at gaming is an obligation arising from a "contract, express or implied" within the meaning of Section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Ruling

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, and the proceedings are dismissed. The Court held that the Court of First Instance had the authority to issue the writ of attachment.

Ratio Decidendi

On the availability of certiorari for attachments issued without statutory authority: The Supreme Court held that it has original jurisdiction by writ of certiorari over proceedings of Courts of First Instance where said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court clarified that "has not regularly pursued its authority" and "exceeded their jurisdiction" should be construed together, meaning any irregular exercise of judicial power in excess of lawful jurisdiction is remediable by certiorari, provided no other adequate remedy exists. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction in attachment cases refers not only to the authority to entertain the principal action but also to the authority to issue the attachment, dependent on the existence of statutory grounds. Issuing an attachment without statutory authority is an irregular exercise of jurisdiction justifying certiorari. The Court distinguished this from interlocutory injunctions, which are largely discretionary and inherent in judicial authority. On whether the obligation to restore money lost at gaming is a "contract, express or implied": The Court examined the meaning of "contract, express or implied" in Section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure, noting that the Code speaks the language of the common law. It delved into the historical development of contract law in the common law, distinguishing between the concept of debt (arising from a quid pro quo) and the concept of assumpsit (arising from a promise). The Court concluded that the duty to pay or deliver a sum certain, even if imposed by statute, custom, or judgment, is recognized as a true contract in the common law system, falling under the category of debt. The obligation to refund money won at gaming, imposed by Act No. 1757, is a statutory duty to return a certain sum, which the Court classified as a debt and therefore an implied contract under the common law criteria. The Court cited English authorities recognizing the recovery of money lost in gambling through an action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, which signifies an implied contract or quasi-contract in common law. The Court also considered the Civil Code's classification of obligations, noting that while the obligation arises ex lege and from an illicit act (gambling), it has a decided affinity to contractual obligations and could be considered an innominate quasi-contract. However, the decision rested on the common law interpretation of "implied contract."

Main Doctrine

A writ of certiorari may be availed of to quash an attachment issued without statutory authority, as such issuance constitutes an irregular exercise of judicial power in excess of jurisdiction. The statutory obligation to restore money lost at gaming, being a duty imposed by statute and in the nature of a debt, is properly classified as an implied contract under the Code of Civil Procedure, thus allowing for the issuance of an attachment.

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