Pamana v. Hernandez
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner, Pamana, Inc., filed two separate complaints for forcible entry with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents. Pamana, Inc. claimed ownership and lawful possession of several parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, evidenced by specific Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). The respondents, however, denied these allegations, asserting that the lots they occupied were Lot 5 of TCT No. T-66140 and Lot 7 of TCT No. T-61703, registered in the name of Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation, which had granted them permission to occupy the premises. 2. Procedural History: The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calamba, Laguna, tried the cases jointly under the Rules on Summary Procedure and rendered a decision on December 10, 1996, ordering the respondents to vacate the premises. The respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which initially remanded the cases to the MTC. However, upon reconsideration, the RTC affirmed the MTC's decision. This order became final and executory, leading the MTC to issue a Writ of Execution and subsequently a Writ of Demolition. The respondents then filed a Petition for Prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA) to restrain the sheriff from implementing the demolition writ. 3. The Petition: Pamana, Inc. filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The CA had set aside the MTC's Order of Execution, Writ of Execution, and Writ of Demolition concerning Lots 5 and 7, finding that these lots were not included in the original ejectment suits. Pamana, Inc. argued that the CA erred in giving due course to the petition for prohibition against a final and executory decision, in ruling that Lots 5 and 7 were not covered by the MTC decision, and in prohibiting the implementation of the demolition writ when the act was already fait accompli.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition for prohibition despite the existence of an appeal and the alleged fait accompli nature of the demolition. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Municipal Trial Court's decision did not include Lots 5 and 7, the premises occupied by the respondents. Whether prohibition was the proper remedy for the respondents.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of prohibition and the alleged fait accompli: The Court held that prohibition was the proper remedy because respondents were not imputing an error of judgment on the part of the MTC or RTC, but rather assailing the sheriff's act of implementing the writs on properties not included in the judgment. The Court clarified that prohibition is directed against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, and its purpose is to command the respondent to desist from further proceedings. The claim of fait accompli was dismissed as the petition for prohibition was filed before the scheduled demolition, and the Sheriff's Return, dated later, did not conclusively prove the demolition occurred prior to the filing of the petition. Furthermore, even if the demolition was fully implemented, it did not alter the CA's decision setting aside the order of execution and writs concerning Lots 5 and 7. On whether the MTC decision included Lots 5 and 7: The Court sustained the Court of Appeals' ruling that the MTC decision did not include Lots 5 and 7. The complaints filed by petitioner clearly identified the subject parcels of land by their TCT numbers, which corresponded to specific lots (Lot 2-B-3-D-2, Lot 2-B-3-C, Lot 8, Lot 3, and Lot 4). Lots 5 and 7, covered by different TCTs in the name of Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation, were not among those listed in petitioner's complaints. Petitioner itself admitted it did not list Lots 5 and 7 in its complaints. Therefore, the phrase "premises in question" in the MTC decision could only refer to the lots owned by petitioner and described in its titles, not Lots 5 and 7. On whether prohibition was the proper remedy: The Court disagreed with petitioner's contention that respondents should have filed a petition for certiorari instead of prohibition. The Court distinguished between certiorari and prohibition, noting that certiorari is directed at annulling or modifying a proceeding of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, while prohibition is directed at commanding a respondent to desist from further proceedings. The Court emphasized that the sheriff's act of implementing writs of execution and demolition are purely ministerial functions. Since respondents sought to restrain the sheriff from implementing the writs on Lots 5 and 7, which they maintained were not part of the judgment, prohibition was the appropriate remedy. The Court also clarified that appeal is not the remedy when the issue is not an error of judgment but an act of the sheriff exceeding the mandate of the court's judgment.
Main Doctrine
A writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to restrain a sheriff from implementing a writ of execution or demolition on properties not included in the judgment sought to be executed, as the sheriff's act of implementing such writs on properties outside the judgment constitutes a ministerial function that exceeds the court's mandate.