Dula v. Maravilla
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents spouses Restituto and Teresita Maravilla purchased a 5-door apartment building, Unit A of which was occupied by petitioner David G. Dula since 1968 under an oral month-to-month lease agreement with the former owner at a monthly rental of P2,112.00. Procedural History: On January 10, 1994, respondents notified petitioner of the termination of his lease effective January 31, 1994, citing personal use and giving him three months to vacate. Petitioner refused, prompting respondents to file an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate, pay rentals, and attorney's fees. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC decision in toto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with modification, deleting the award for attorney's fees. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner sought to nullify the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, raising issues regarding the alleged fatal flaw in the ejectment complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the error in ordering ejectment based on lease expiration not pleaded, and the suspension of Article 1687 of the Civil Code by Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) Blg. 877.
Issue(s)
Whether the ejectment complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action despite failing to explicitly allege that respondents owned no other residential unit in the same municipality. Whether the ejectment of the petitioner was justified on the ground of expiration of the lease contract, even if not explicitly pleaded as a ground for ejectment in the complaint. Whether Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which determines the period of a month-to-month lease, was suspended by Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The judgment is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the sufficiency of the cause of action and the allegation of personal use: The Court held that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 5(c) of B.P. Blg. 877. While the complaint itself did not explicitly state that respondents owned no other residential unit, this deficiency was cured by the allegations in respondents' Supplemental to Position Paper, which stated that respondents had no other property in Makati except the leased premises. The Court reiterated that a defective complaint in summary procedure may be cured by evidence presented during the trial, including allegations in the position paper. The essential requisites for ejectment under Section 5(c) were found to be present, including the owner's legitimate need, lack of other available residential units, expiration of the lease, formal notice, and the lessor's undertaking not to lease the property for at least one year. On the ground of expiration of the lease contract: The Court affirmed that the expiration of the lease contract is a valid ground for judicial ejectment under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877. It clarified that B.P. Blg. 877 amended Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 to include the "expiration of the period of the lease contract" as a ground, removing the distinction between written and oral lease contracts. Therefore, even if the ground of expiration was not explicitly pleaded in the complaint, it could still be a basis for ejectment, especially since the lease was a month-to-month arrangement. On the suspension of Article 1687 of the Civil Code: The Court definitively ruled that Article 1687 of the Civil Code was NOT suspended by Section 6 of B.P. Blg. 877. The suspension under Section 6 pertains only to paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code, which deals with the lessor's inability to eject a tenant solely due to the expiration of a definite lease period. Article 1687, which establishes that a lease with monthly rent and no fixed period is a month-to-month lease, remains in effect. Consequently, a month-to-month lease is considered a lease with a definite period, and its expiration, upon proper notice, can be a ground for ejectment under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877. The Court cited previous rulings in De Vera v. Court of Appeals and Rivera v. Florendo to support this conclusion.
Main Doctrine
A month-to-month lease, under Article 1687 of the Civil Code, is considered a lease with a definite period, the expiration of which, upon proper notice, can be a ground for judicial ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877. The suspension of Article 1673 of the Civil Code by Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 does not suspend Article 1687.