Pangan v. Gatbalite
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Benjamin Pangan y Rivera was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816 before the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3. During the trial, his counsel, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence due to petitioner's consistent absence from hearings. Consequently, on September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor. This decision was affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court on appeal on October 24, 1988. Procedural History: On August 9, 1991, the case was called for the promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, petitioner's counsel did not appear, and a notice to the petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a result, the petitioner also failed to appear for the promulgation. The court of origin then issued an order for the recording of the decision and an order for the petitioner's arrest. Pursuant to this arrest order, petitioner was apprehended on January 20, 2000, and detained. Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, impleading the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga, as respondent. After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, he filed an Amended Petition, impleading the City Jail Warden as respondent. The Regional Trial Court denied the petition on January 31, 2000. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the January 31, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court. The core issue presented is the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code concerning the commencement of the prescriptive period for penalties. Petitioner contends that the prescriptive period begins to run from the moment a judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict evades arrest for service of sentence, arguing that the RTC's reliance on the Infante v. Warden ruling, which requires actual escape during service of sentence, imposes a condition not stated in the law. He asserts that his failure to appear for promulgation and subsequent evasion of arrest for nearly nine years should trigger the prescription of his sentence, as the government failed to apprehend him within the five-year prescriptive period.
Issue(s)
Whether the prescriptive period for the penalty of arresto mayor imposed on the petitioner began to run from the date of promulgation of the judgment and issuance of the order of arrest, considering he never served any part of the sentence. Whether the phrase "should evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code includes a convict who, after final judgment, fails to appear for service of sentence and remains at large without having been apprehended; and the implications of never having commenced serving the sentence.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, it ordered the immediate release of the petitioner as he had fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor, unless detained for another offense.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of penalties: The Court reiterated that for the period of prescription of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code to commence, the convict must have "evaded service of his sentence." This evasion, as defined by Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the convict to be serving a sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty and to escape during the term of that imprisonment. The phrase "evasion of service of sentence" is synonymous with "jail breaking" and presupposes that the convict has already commenced serving the sentence. In the present case, the petitioner was convicted by final judgment but was never apprehended or committed to prison to serve his sentence of arresto mayor. He failed to appear for the promulgation of the judgment and an order of arrest was issued, but he remained at large. Since he never commenced serving his sentence, he could not have "escaped during the term of his imprisonment." Therefore, the essential element of evasion of service of sentence, as required by Article 93 and interpreted in conjunction with Article 157, was absent. Consequently, the prescriptive period for the penalty never began to run in his favor. The Court distinguished the present case from situations where a convict might have served part of a sentence and then escaped, or where a convict on conditional pardon breaches the condition. In those instances, the period of prescription might be interrupted or have a different starting point. However, for a convict who has never been deprived of liberty to serve a sentence, the prescription of penalty does not run. Because petitioner Pangan was never committed to prison and thus never escaped during the term of his sentence, the prescriptive period for his arresto mayor penalty did not commence. His detention pursuant to the order of commitment was therefore legal, as it was based on a final judgment. However, the Court noted that by the time of the decision, he had fully served the sentence. On the issue of the meaning of "evade the service of sentence" and its implications: The Court clarified that the phrase "should evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 does not encompass a situation where a convict, by failing to appear for arrest after final judgment, successfully eludes apprehension without ever having begun to serve the sentence. Such an interpretation would require judicial legislation, as the law specifically requires escape during service of sentence. The Court emphasized that the duty of the government to arrest and compel service of sentence arises upon final judgment, and the prescriptive period for the penalty only begins to run if the convict actively evades service by escaping from confinement. Since the petitioner never commenced serving his sentence, the element of evasion of service of sentence was absent.
Main Doctrine
The period of prescription of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code commences to run only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of imprisonment, not from the date of promulgation of the judgment or issuance of an arrest order when the convict has not yet served any part of the sentence.