Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Abella
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The core dispute revolves around a one-hectare parcel of land adjacent to the Peñiafrancia Basilica in Naga City. The petitioner, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres, claims the land was donated to him by the respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella, in exchange for perpetual masses. The respondents vehemently deny this donation, asserting that the petitioner encroached upon and fenced the land without their consent. 2. Procedural History: Initially, the petitioner filed a forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 8479) which was decided in his favor by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, while this case was pending, the respondents filed a separate action for quieting of title (Civil Case No. 89-1802) concerning the same property. This quieting of title case resulted in a judgment declaring the respondents as the rightful co-owners of the property, with the petitioner only being recognized as the owner of a smaller, previously donated portion. This decision was affirmed by the CA and the Supreme Court. The petitioner's subsequent motion to execute the forcible entry judgment was denied by the MTC, a denial upheld by the RTC. The CA, to which the case was referred, also denied the petition, ruling that the final judgment in the quieting of title case, which declared the respondents as owners, constituted a supervening event rendering the forcible entry judgment unenforceable. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision that denied his petition for review. The sole issue presented is whether the final and executory judgment in the quieting of title case, which declared the respondents as owners, qualifies as a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the earlier, final judgment in the forcible entry case. The petitioner argues that ownership does not automatically equate to possession and posits a theory of perpetual usufruct, a claim inconsistent with his prior assertions of ownership.
Issue(s)
Whether the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title, which declared respondents as owners of the subject property, constitutes a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous forcible entry case. Whether the petitioner's claim of perpetual usufruct over the property is a valid basis for possession, despite the respondents being declared owners in the quieting of title case, considering the nature of ownership findings in ejectment cases and the petitioner's change of theory.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 4, 2000, and its Resolution dated May 29, 2000, are affirmed. The final and executory judgment in the quieting of title case, which declared respondents as the owners of the subject property, is a supervening event that renders the judgment in the forcible entry case, awarding possession to the petitioner, unenforceable.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of supervening event and enforceability of judgments: The Court held that the finality of the judgment in the quieting of title case, which conclusively declared the respondents as the absolute owners of the subject property, constitutes a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the prior final and executory judgment in the forcible entry case. This is because the judgment in the quieting of title case resolved the fundamental issue of ownership, which was the basis of the petitioner's claim of possession in the forcible entry case. To allow execution of the forcible entry judgment would work injustice to the respondents, who have been conclusively declared the rightful owners and possessors. The Court clarified that while the jurisdiction of a court to amend its judgment generally terminates when the judgment becomes final, there is an exception for supervening events. Supervening events are facts that transpire after a judgment has become final and executory, or new circumstances that developed after finality, including matters unknown to the parties prior to or during the trial. The finality of the quieting of title judgment, resolving ownership and possession, fits this exception. On the petitioner's claim of perpetual usufruct and the nature of ownership findings: The Court found the petitioner's argument that he was granted perpetual usufruct to be unmeritorious, noting the petitioner's change of theory. The petitioner's theory from the outset was that he was entitled to possession as the owner because the property was transferred to him by onerous donation. He cannot change his theory on appeal to claim usufruct, as this is inconsistent with his previous allegations and would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. The rule is well-settled that issues not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court reiterated that any finding of ownership in an ejectment case, such as forcible entry, is merely provisional and not conclusive, made solely for determining who has the better right of possession de facto, whereas the ruling in a case for quieting of title is conclusive as to ownership. The Court emphasized that the finding in the quieting of title case, that the respondents never agreed to donate the property or allow the petitioner to occupy it, prevails over the ruling in the forcible entry case. Since the respondents never made the alleged donation, there is no legal or factual basis for the petitioner to claim the right of possession. The circumstances described, such as the fencing done without Mrs. Abella's knowledge and her subsequent actions to stop the work, further negate the idea of a donation or consent to occupation.
Main Doctrine
The finality of a judgment in a case for quieting of title, which conclusively resolves the issue of ownership and the concomitant right of possession, constitutes a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of a prior final and executory judgment in a forcible entry case, especially when the petitioner's claim of ownership in the forcible entry case was based on an alleged donation, which was subsequently negated by the quieting of title judgment.