Garrucho v. Binamira
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Peter D. Garrucho, then Secretary of Tourism and Chairman of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), requested the issuance of Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) against Ramon Binamira and Faustino Roberto in connection with an investigation into anomalous transactions involving government securities that caused a loss of ₱161,000,000.00 to the PTA. HDO Nos. 333 and 334 were issued. Roberto filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against Garrucho and the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, with Binamira intervening. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati City ruled in favor of Binamira, declaring HDO No. 333 void ab initio and ordering Garrucho and the Commissioner to pay damages. Procedural History: Garrucho and Commissioner Domingo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA sent notices to file briefs by registered mail to Garrucho's counsel, but these were returned "Moved Out." The CA resent the notice to Garrucho's office, but it was returned "unclaimed." The CA declared service complete as of May 5, 1999. Subsequently, the CA dismissed Garrucho's appeal for failure to file a brief. Notices of this resolution were also returned "Moved Out" or "Unclaimed." The CA issued an entry of judgment. The RTC granted Binamira's motion for execution, and a writ of execution was served on Garrucho at his new office. The Petition: Garrucho filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the CA resolutions and the RTC order and writ of execution. He argued that he was deprived of due process because he never received copies of the CA resolutions, as they were sent to his former office at the Department of Tourism, from which he had resigned in January 1991. He claimed he had moved to the private sector and provided his new office address. He also argued that the CA and RTC should have taken judicial notice of his resignation and subsequent appointments. He contended that his current office was not difficult to locate, as evidenced by the sheriff's service of the writ of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court erred in issuing the assailed resolutions and order, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process; and whether the service of notices and resolutions by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court on the petitioner was legally valid and sufficient.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal, and the petitioner was not deprived of due process.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Due Process and Validity of Service: The Court held that the petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. Under Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of record in the court of origin is considered the counsel in the appellate court. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that service upon a party represented by counsel shall be made upon his counsel, unless the court orders otherwise. The Court emphasized that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, service must be made at the last known address of the counsel on record. It is the duty of both the party and his counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail and to officially inform the court of any change in address. In this case, the law firm of Remollo & Associates, petitioner's counsel, moved out without informing the court, and the CA sent notices to their last known address. Furthermore, the petitioner himself failed to inform the court of his new home or office address after his resignation from government service. The CA cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the petitioner's private office address after his departure from public office. The petitioner's argument that the sheriff was able to locate his office for the service of the writ of execution is unavailing, as the CA resolutions were issued prior to such service. The Court reiterated the principle that litigants, even when represented by counsel, must actively monitor the status of their cases and cannot simply sit back and await the outcome. The petitioner's failure to inquire about the status of his appeal for several months was deemed inexcusable negligence, and he had nobody but himself to blame for the dismissal of his appeal.
Main Doctrine
A party and his counsel have the duty to inform the court of any change in address. Failure to do so, resulting in the non-receipt of notices and subsequent dismissal of an appeal, constitutes inexcusable negligence and does not violate due process.