Villorente v. Aplaya Laiya Corporation
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Aplaya Laiya Corporation (ALC) owned 151.38 hectares of agricultural land in Batangas. The ALC sought to develop this property into a tourist spot, initiating a conversion application from agricultural to non-agricultural use. This application received endorsements from various regional and national councils, culminating in a Resolution from the National Land Use Council recommending approval to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. On November 6, 1996, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued a Conversion Order, approving the conversion and noting it was without prejudice to the payment of disturbance compensation to displaced farmers. The Order was posted in the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and a Certification of Publication was issued, attesting to compliance with posting requirements and the absence of objections. Procedural History: Following the Conversion Order, ALC began negotiations with tenants and occupants, including the Spouses Villorente and Spouses Bajeta, for disturbance compensation. Disagreements arose over the amounts. On January 26, 1998, a motion for reconsideration of the Conversion Order was filed by members of the Kooperatibang Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMPI), including some of the herein petitioners, arguing a lack of due process and improper notification. DAR Secretary Garilao denied this motion on May 25, 1998. The KSMPI then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but their motion for an extension to file the petition for review was denied, leading to the dismissal of their appeal. Subsequently, ALC filed ejectment cases against the Spouses Villorente and Spouses Bajeta in December 1998, alleging they refused to vacate despite offers of relocation and compensation. In response, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA on March 31, 1999, assailing the original November 6, 1996 Conversion Order, claiming they only learned of it upon receiving the ejectment summons. The Petition: The petitioners seek reversal of the CA's decision, which dismissed their petition for review on the ground of untimeliness. They argue that the CA erred in holding the Conversion Order final and executory, asserting they only became aware of it on March 1, 1999. They contend that the KSMPI's prior appeal should not prejudice them and that the rule on constructive notice should be suspended due to their status as poor farmers. The petitioners also raise constitutional and statutory challenges to the conversion, alleging violations of agrarian reform mandates and lack of jurisdiction by the DAR Secretary. They further claim the conversion order was obtained to circumvent CARP coverage. The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed to challenge the CA's dismissal, citing errors in its findings regarding the finality of the Conversion Order and the petitioners' knowledge thereof.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Conversion Order of November 6, 1996, is already final and executory, rendering the petitioners' petition filed out of time. Whether the petitioners were denied due process and their substantive rights were violated. Whether Executive Order No. 124 and Joint NEDA-DAR M.C. No. 1, Series of 1993, are void for violating the constitutional mandate of agrarian reform and Republic Act No. 6657. Whether the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction in not considering the CARP-capability of the subject properties adjacent to or portions of which are already covered by CARP. Whether the Conversion Order is cancelable due to the failure of Aplaya Laiya Corporation to commence development of the subject properties, in violation of DAR A.O. No. 01, S-93 and 07, S-97, and was resorted to circumvent CARP coverage. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners' petition for review.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for review as it was filed out of time. The Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary had long become final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition for review and the finality of the Conversion Order: The Court held that the Conversion Order of the DAR was a final order resolving the issue of conversion to non-agricultural use. Its finality was not dependent on the subsequent determination of disturbance compensation. Under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, final orders of quasi-judicial bodies are appealable to the CA via a petition for review filed within 15 days from notice or from the date of its last publication if publication is required. In this case, the petitioners, as members of KSMPI, participated in negotiations for disturbance compensation shortly after the Conversion Order was issued. They opted not to appeal the Conversion Order directly. A motion for reconsideration was filed by KSMPI over a year after the Conversion Order, which was denied. The subsequent appeal by KSMPI to the CA was dismissed, and that dismissal became final. The petitioners' own petition for review was filed over two years after the Conversion Order, clearly beyond the reglementary period. The publication of the order, as certified by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, served as notice to all concerned farmers-beneficiaries, contradicting the petitioners' claim of learning about it only upon receipt of ejectment summons. The Court found their claim of ignorance to be unbelievable, especially given their participation in negotiations. On the alleged violation of due process and substantive rights: The Court found that the petitioners' participation in negotiations for disturbance compensation, which was a condition imposed by the Conversion Order, estopped them from assailing the said order. By agreeing to negotiate for compensation based on the conversion, they implicitly acknowledged the validity of the order. To allow them to assail the order after participating in its implementation would be to permit them to approbate and disapprobate simultaneously, which is contrary to the principle of estoppel. The DAR Secretary's denial of the motion for reconsideration was based on the lack of merit, and the subsequent appeal by KSMPI was dismissed, indicating that the procedural and substantive issues were considered and resolved. On the alleged nullity of Executive Order No. 124 and Joint NEDA-DAR M.C. No. 1, Series of 1993: The respondent ALC averred that the petitioners never questioned the constitutionality of these issuances before the DAR or the DARAB, and therefore, they were proscribed from doing so before the CA. The Supreme Court did not directly rule on the merits of this argument but implicitly upheld the validity of the conversion process by focusing on the procedural timeliness of the appeal. The petitioners' failure to raise these constitutional issues at the earliest opportunity before the administrative bodies meant they could not raise them for the first time on appeal to the CA, especially when the primary issue was the timeliness of their appeal. On the CARP-capability of the subject properties: The petitioners argued that adjacent properties were covered by CARP, and the DAR Secretary should have considered this. However, the Supreme Court's ruling focused on the procedural defect of the late filing of the petition for review. The DAR Secretary's issuance of the Conversion Order was presumed to have been done with due consideration of relevant factors, and the petitioners failed to timely challenge it on these grounds. The Court emphasized that the conversion order itself was a final determination of the property's use, and the subsequent issues of compensation and development were to be handled in accordance with that order. On the alleged failure to commence development and circumventing CARP: The petitioners argued that the conversion order should be cancelable due to ALC's failure to develop the property and that the conversion was a scheme to circumvent CARP. The Court viewed the petition for review as an afterthought when negotiations for disturbance compensation failed. The petitioners had agreed to negotiate for compensation, which was a consequence of the conversion order. Their attempt to assail the order after participating in these negotiations was deemed an act of estoppel. The Court did not delve into the specifics of development timelines or CARP circumvention, as the primary basis for dismissal was the procedural bar of late filing and the principle of estoppel. On whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners' petition for review: The Supreme Court implicitly found that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion, as the dismissal was based on the petitioners' failure to file their petition for review within the prescribed period and their estoppel due to participation in disturbance compensation negotiations.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review of a conversion order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is barred if filed beyond the reglementary period, even if the petitioners claim lack of actual notice, especially when they participated in negotiations for disturbance compensation, thereby invoking the principle of estoppel.