Misterio v. Cebu State College of Science and Technology
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Sudlon Agricultural High School (SAHS), established in 1948 and later nationalized, was granted usufruct of 41 parcels of land in Cebu Province. In 1956, Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio sold Lot No. 1064, comprising 4,563 square meters in Lahug, Cebu City, to SAHS, with a stipulation for the vendor's right to repurchase if the school ceased to exist or transferred its site. This right was annotated on the property's title. In 1960, the Provincial Board of Cebu formally donated the 41 lots to SAHS, subject to reversion if the school ceased operations and a prohibition against alienation. In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 412 converted SAHS into an extension of the Cebu State College of Science and Technology (CSCST). The heirs of Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio asserted their right to repurchase Lot No. 1064 in 1990, following the perceived cessation of SAHS's existence due to its integration into CSCST. Procedural History: The heirs of Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio filed a complaint for Nullity of Sale and/or Redemption against CSCST and its officials in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. They argued that the sale was void due to SAHS's lack of juridical personality and that the enactment of BP Blg. 412 rendered the condition for repurchase operative. The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs, declaring the Deed of Sale null and void and ordering CSCST to reconvey the property upon payment of the purchase price. CSCST appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning multiple errors. The CA reversed the RTC's decision, dismissing the complaint. The CA found that while SAHS had ceased to exist upon the effectivity of BP Blg. 412 in 1983, the heirs' right to repurchase expired in June 1987, four years later, as per Article 1606 of the Civil Code. The CA denied the heirs' motion for reconsideration. The Petition: The petitioners, the heirs of Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal based on prescription, an issue allegedly not raised during the trial, and in concluding that their action had prescribed. The petitioners argue that prescription should only begin to run from the time it is legally feasible to redeem the land, which is contingent on a final judgment confirming the cessation of SAHS's existence. They also claim their right to repurchase is imprescriptible due to its annotation on the title and that they had been vigilant in asserting this right, including a tender of payment in 1990. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding the petitioners' reliance on Article 1606(3) misplaced as it applies to sales without an express agreement on repurchase period, and that the annotation on the title does not affect prescription. The Court affirmed the CA's finding that the repurchase period expired in June 1987.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the issue of prescription when it was allegedly not raised during the trial; and whether the prescriptive period for the right to repurchase was properly considered by the appellate court. Whether the petitioners' right to repurchase the property had prescribed.
Ruling
The petition is denied due course. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing the complaint.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription and the Court of Appeals' authority to rule on it: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling on the issue of prescription. While the respondents' answer did not explicitly raise prescription as a defense, the RTC's decision was based on the cessation of SAHS's existence, which directly relates to the condition for repurchase. The CA, in reviewing the RTC's decision, correctly considered the prescriptive period applicable to the right to repurchase. The petitioners themselves alleged in their complaint that B.P. Blg. 412 rendered operative the condition for redemption, thereby initiating the period for repurchase. Therefore, the issue of prescription was intrinsically linked to the core issues of the case and could be considered by the appellate court. On whether the petitioners' right to repurchase had prescribed: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's finding that the petitioners' right to repurchase had prescribed. The Deed of Sale stipulated that the right to repurchase could be exercised after SAHS ceased to exist or transferred its site. The Court agreed with the CA that B.P. Blg. 412, enacted on June 10, 1983, effectively caused the cessation of SAHS's separate existence. As no period for repurchase was expressly agreed upon, the four-year period under Article 1606 of the New Civil Code applied, commencing from June 10, 1983. Thus, the petitioners had until June 10, 1987, to exercise their right, which they failed to do. The Court clarified that the divergence of opinion between the parties regarding the meaning of "ceased to exist" did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Furthermore, the annotation of the right to repurchase on the title served only to notify third parties and did not make the right imprescriptible.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for exercising the right to repurchase, when stipulated to commence upon the cessation of the vendee's existence or transfer of its site, begins to run from the date the condition is met, regardless of differing interpretations of the condition by the parties. Failure to exercise the right within the statutory period, typically four years in the absence of an express agreement on the period, results in the loss of said right.